Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Master's Theses

Theses and Dissertations

1976

Plato's Notion of Justice in the Republic: Its Authoritarianism
Frustrates Happiness
Robert Tarsitano
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Tarsitano, Robert, "Plato's Notion of Justice in the Republic: Its Authoritarianism Frustrates Happiness"
(1976). Master's Theses. 2843.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/2843

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1976 Robert Tarsitano

.•

PLATO'S NOTION OF JUSTICE IN THE REPUBLIC:
Its Authoritarianism Frustrates Happiness

BY
Robert Tarsitano, Jr.

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

February
1976

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Like every piece of writing, this one is a product of many
minds and sources of inspiration.

My intellectual debt is to those

faculty members of Loyola University of Chicago in whose classes I
had the priviledge of attending.

In this regard, I would like to

thank especially my major advisor, Professor Corey B. Venning, for
her diligent reading of the text and for constructive suggestions on
form and content.

A special thanks also goes to other members of my

committee, Professors Richard S. Hartigan and Thomas J. Bennett for
their accessibility and encouragement in meeting this academic need.
None of them of course are responsible for any errors of interpretation which may occur.
I am also indebted to my family, especially my wife, Betty,
for her patience, a ready willingness to help in preparing

the text

for final typing and continual encouragement to continue my academic
studies despite the brief effects suffered from a physical illness.
Finally, I would like to extend a deep sense of gratitude to my mother,
~na,

for her inspiration to me in her living an exemplary life.

dedicate this writing to her.

ii

I

.•

VITA
The author, Robert Tarsitano, Jr., is the son of Robert Tarsitano
(deceased) and Anna (Maioni) Tarsitano.

He was born July 6, 1935 in

Chicago, Illinois.
His elementary and secondary education was obtained in the
parochial schools of

C~icago,

Illinois.

At the elementary level, he

attended Our Lady of Pompeii School, and at the secondary level, he
graduated from St. Patrick Academy in 1953.
After his honorable discharge from the United States Air Force,
having served four years of active duty during the Korean War, he
attended DePaul University, Chicago, Illinois, where he took his Bachelor of Arts degree in June, 1962.
He has taught American History and Government at the secondary
level in the Chicago Metropolitan Area, and for several years, he was
a teaching missionary with the Sioux Indian on the Rosebud Reservation,
South Dakota.

During his stay with the Sioux, he received numerous

letters of commendation from national public officials for his pioneering work in the development of their living conditions.
with this effort, he authored:

In connection

Rosebud's Housing Component, Office of

Economic Opportunity, Washington, D. C., 1965, and "Reflections on the
Sioux of Rosebud," Western Brand Book, Beverly liills, California, 1965.
He was an eligible recipient of a Regency Tuition Fellowship,
a National Science Foundation Grant, and is presently a holder of a
United States Patent..

He is a member of the American Political Science

Association and the Midwest Political Science Association.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ••

.......

ii

VITA • • •

iii

A FIGURE

vi

CHAPTER

I.
II.

INTRODUCTION • • • • • • •

........

....

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON ART, POt.JER
AND VIRTUE. • •

3

Influence of Education on Art and Virtue •
Hierarchy of Virtue Leads to Hierarchy of

3

5

Arts. . . . . . . . . . . .

Plato's Fundamental Challenge:
a Good in Itself ••
III.

Is Justice

12

15

EXTERNAL JUSTICE •
Emergence of the City • • • • • • • •
Character of the Guardian's Disposition ••
Plato's "Educational " Content: Censorship,
Deception, anq Propaganda • • •
Educational Style • • • • • • • •
The Nature of the Competent Man's
Reasoning • . . . . . . • . • . . . • • .

Plato's Gymnastic Theory of Education
Nature and Effect of Common Ownership
of Property • • •
Is the City Virtuous

.....

IV.

1

.....

INTERNAL JUSTICE • • •

The Divisions of a Single Man:
Argument. • • • • • • • • •

iv

...

15
16
19
25

...
..

29
30

35
39

..

45

The
• • 45

---

CHAPTER
V.

Page
POLITICAL POWER FROM THE GRAND LEAP
TOWARD "KNOWLEDGE" •
The Philosopher's Edge Over the Many.
A Short Epistemological Framework ••
Origin and Content of the Opinion of·

51

...

the Many • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••

Educating in Philosophy by Similes and
Allegory • • • • •
Simile of the Sun • • • • • • •
Simile of the Divided Line,
Allegory of the Cave. • , ••
Are Plato's Similes Use for Parallel or
Illustrative Purposes? ••
Philosophical Significance of the Lower
Line and the Cave • • • • • • • • • •
Philosophical Treatment of the Upper Line
and the Cave • • • • • • • •
Differences between Philosopher and
Mathematir.i.an. • • • • , • • • •
• • • •
"The Deeper We Go, the Less We 'Truly' ¥.now • • •

51
54

55

62
63
63
65

66
69
72

74
7.6

. . . . . . . . . . . . ..

80

REFERENCES • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

93

VI.

SUMMARY CONCLUSION •

v

.•

A FIGURE

Page

Figure
I.

The Divided Line • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

vi

63

--INTRODUCTION
This study deals with the question of whether Plato's justice, as
described in the Republic, tends to make men happy.
stresses his authoritarian political views.

This reading

In a close examination of

the Republic, one is exposed to arguments that establish a society into
hierarchically arranged classes.
men are superior to other men.

Plato contends that naturally some
This superiority rests upon knowledge

of the Form of justice which only a few men, i.e., the superior, can
perceive.

Hence, they alone are fit to rule the bulk of humanity.

Presuming that the knowledge of the great mass of men is limited to
less pervasive fields of interest, and that they are thus incapable of
self-rule, they should, according to Plato, follow the rulers.
But are Plato's citizens given the necessary opportunities to
accomplish what they desire to accomplish? .Does he compel them, by
force or otherwise, to be placed into set molds or classes?

Is the de-

sign of the Republic geared to limit free expression for all men?
these concerns in mind, the Republic has been studied and analyzed.

With
It

is concluded that Plato, to a large degree, limits one's self-expression
more than he enhances it.

In this regard, the Republic is considered a

largely authoritarian political document and, as such, negatively answers the question of justice and happiness in society.
With respect to the arrangement of the content in the thesis, the
discussi.on is chronologically organize<:!.

For purposes of clarity,

rather than shuffling back and forth in the document, the thesis analyzes the topics as Plato presented them.
1

This r.iethod of analysis

2
.•

discourages the criticism of quoting out of context.

As Plato presents

his case, as it were, occasional interpolations of the discussion will
be presented in terms of evaluating his presuppositions, logical consistencies or inconsistencies, begging the questions, and so on.

.•

CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON ART, POWER AND VIRTUE
Influence of Education on Art and Virtue
What does Plato mean by art?

Art (techne) is an ability or power

designed to provide an advantage over the material of an art.
definition, is without blemish, deprivation or defect.

Art, by

It is as per-

feet as possible.
It is not enough for a body to be a body. • •• It needs something
else. And, the art of medicine has now been discovered because
a body is defective •••• and it won't do. The art was devised
for the purpose of providing advantages to the body •••• It is
1
correct so long as it is precisely and wholly what it is. (342bc).
That is to say, art becomes real when it: in fact, does provide advantages, as when the art of mediine cures ill or deprived bodies, or the
sailor's art provides safety in sea travel.

Similarly, the art of the

ruler must provide an advantage to weak, unruly men.
tice so that men can be happy.

It provides jus-

Providing advantages then is what des-

ignates an art as a working real art.

It indeed gives advantages to
2

defective or weaker bodies or things.

So the practicing artist, in a

1
Plato, The Complete Works of Plato, ed. by Henri Estienne
(Stephanus) and translated by Jean de Serres, Geneva, 1578.
2
Plato's 'material' over which art provides advantages are seen
more as animate things, which seem to possess "powers" to make that particular art successful. Herein lies a basic distinction between, say,
the medical art and the art of painting. Medicine seems to help dire- '
ctly an ill animate body to become well as the body somehow aids this
healing. Painting, on the other hand,"deals with inanimate things which
cannot reciprocate "aid" in the same way animate things do. Indirectly,
though, th2 painting may induce one aesthetically to feel better.
3

4
.•

sense, is a master or ruler over the weak, not for the benefit of the
artist or the art, but for the recipient of the art, i.e., the weak.
Nor does horsemanship consider the advantage of horsemanship, but
of horses. Nor does any art consider its own advantage, for it
doesn't have any further need to •••• but the advantage of what is
weaker and ruled by it. There isn't anyone who rules that considers or commands own advantage rather than that of what is ruled,
for its advantage that he says everything he s~ys and does everything he does (342de).
Art can only be an advantage, if it is possessed by men who are
disposed, by nature, with a specific excellence (virtue, arete) that
helps one to perform a specific art best.3
Each of us is naturally not quite like anyone else, but rather differs in his nature; different men are apt for the accomplishment of
different arts (353b).
Men are properly born to be doctors, carpenters, and so on.
in fact, is apt to do its own peculiar art.

Anything,

For example, an eye's

techne is to see; ear's, to hear, and so on (353bc).

It is the virtue

of a thing that dispos.es a thing to do its art and to do its best.
But, if the virtue of.an eye, the power to see, is diminished or gone,
the eye's art of seeing will also wane.
diminish~ent

To Plato, lack of power or

of virtue are forms of a thing's deprivations.

vation is a vice.

A depri-

It is an absence or a decrease of the essential in-

tensity of a virtue that naturally exists in something.
an art provides advantages to something weaker.

Briefly, then,

Each man is disposed

in a certain way to a specific excellence which can make an art work
3
I. A. Richards takes a special exception to Plato's "one man,
one art" concept. In his _Plato's Republic (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 11, he suggests it is a defective
policy if pushed to great lengths. I t loses sight of a "widely recognized fact that any expert in any art usually needs newer experiences
from creative experts in similar arts or others." So, some sort of
creative change is an eventuality for any artist.

5

advantageously.
the advantage.

But the excellence alone is insufficient to provide
What is it that it lacks?

Certainly, Plato implies in the above that men are born good.
That is to say, men possess a specific excellence (a virtue) which is
good in itself.
or educated.

But specific excellences (virtues) must be developed

A lack of a proper education, Plato asserts, can result

in the virtue turning into a bad thing.

For example, if a soul has

the virtue of wisdom, it can possess the specific art to manage, to
rule and to deliberate on public things.
soul's art.

Living, as it were, is the

But, if the virtue is deprived (poorly educated), its art

of ruling cannot be accomplished well.

.It is executed badly.

In the

end, the soul necessarily rules badly, whereas a good soul, one properly educated, can rule well.
education and badly without it.
the same argument" (353ce).
its consequences.

So things are done well with proper
"And everything else is included in

So, in the end, a thing is good or bad in

And, the power to give good or bad advantages to the

weak depends upon the sort of education a thing receives.
outset, education plays a major role for Plato.

So, from the

He claims that each

man has a specific excellence, which when properly educated will let
him use his art to benefit the subject matter (the object) of the art,
be they ill bodies, horses or weak, unruly men.
Hierarchy of Virtue Leads to Hierarchv of Arts
Virtues are arranged hierarchically.

At the apex is wisdom.

supplements are courage, moderation and justice.

An individual born

with the v:l.rtue of wisdom possesses the excellence to counsel well.
is a wise ruler.

Its

But the ruler needs the cooperation, not the

He

6

competition, of the other men.

Men whose excellence is courage must

defend the opinion or counsel of the ruler.

Men who are neither wise

nor courageous will possess moderation, if they balance their pleasures
(appetites) and pains for the good of the whole city.

In the end,

Plato maintains that when these virtues operate in this fashion, the
vir.tue of justice emerges.
arrangement.

It is a derivative of this hierarchical

A well ruled city then is said to be just.

It is the

last piece, as it were, to be fitted into a jigsaw puzzle, entitled the
"just city."
Furthermore, Plato maintains that each art has its own sphere of
control and it is this diversity of control that accounts for the difference between the arts.

The medical art's area of control (responsi-

bility) is the curing of ill bodies, while the sailor's is safety on
the sea.

He indicates that a general art is required to be responsible

for all occasions and over specific arts, as well as the overall way
one conducts one's life.
other arts.

It has no specific control like the others, but a field

that includes the others.
in all ways.

This general art then must encompass all the

It focuses on how men should live rightly

Plato imputes that the general art is the responsibility

of the ruling art.4

One of his main aims in writing the dialogue is

4
Some commentators accuse Plato of having an ambiguous poetry or
art. J. Tate, in his "Plato and 'Imitation,'" Classical Quarterly,
XXII (1928), pp. 161-64, however, advises that in as much as art rests
upon his metaphysics before making relevant conclusions on the art of
ruling, one should critically analyze the metaphysics. Tate contends
that any ambiguity arising from Plato's discussion of art may be clarified by a keen look at his notion of 'imitation.' Good poetry or art,
he suggests, imitates the ideal world of knowledge once removed from
that world, while bad poetry or art is twice removed. It uses opinion
and sense experience. So, depending on Plato's use of the term, the
ruling art, a commentator will come away with a better understanding of
it.
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.essentially to make this point obvious.

Moreover, as the art of medi-

cine is found in one having the ability to practice medicine well, so
too does the art of ruling need a place in one who has the ability to
practice the ruling art well.

Plato calls the ability or virtue to

practice the ruling art well the power of knowledge.

It is basically

an innate ability of knowing what is good for the city.

It is not

meant to be synonymous w:i.th the power to mobilize large groups.
sees this ability as more of

a

Plato

personal intellectual attribute of a

ruler than one design.ed to incite the fears and emotions of the masses.
The art of ruling then, he continues, is not restricted to any
specific occasion or personal acquaintance.
maintain the regime's political stability.

Its duty is to all men to
Since ruling is an all

encompassing art, its purpose must be designed for the advantage of
all.

It cannot be designed to help only friends and not enemies.

If

justice, being a derivative of the art of ruling, were to operate this
way, it would simply be a morality of demonstration.

Such a moral dis-

play would falter, since its machinations rest essentially on individual behaviors, not on principles.

A house built of sand soon crumbles.

Specifying occasions for the art of ruling to work, like paying debts,
honoring contracts, etc., can lead to dilemmas, Plato states, especially when associated with a ruler's fallibility.

It would be just to

steal from friends, if thought to be enemies, and give to enemies, if
thought to be friends.
mum.

The number of laws are kept to an extreme mini-

So, it seems absurd to Plato to think that the art of ruling only

informs one's behavior on special occasions or with special friendships.

The art of ruling then is not a specialized art, but a general-

i.zed one designed to control (mastering) all men's living patterns.

8
In effect, then, Plato's ruling principle is to maintain political stability.

The regime operates as one entity where individual grievances

are less important than political cohesion.

Rulers, it seems, are

largely incapable to judge whether private iniquities are adjudicable,
unless the altercations adversely affect the regime's stability.

With

the absence of such overwhelming adversity, it is conceivable that Person A could quite easily steal from Person B without impunity.

As a

result, it is not too difficult to envision a regime ruled by an elite
wielding large doses of discretionary political power.
On another matter, Plato states that no one is willing to practice one's art without a reward in return.

Willingness to perform is

derived from some form of wage, either money, honor, or a penalty.
Since this wage is an advantage or benefit for the artist, according
to Plato's definition of art, some art form must exist for that which
it is an art.

The wage-earning art then is created, which induces the

artist to practice it willingly.

Otherwise, no one would be willing to

perform any art.
For it isn't because of sailing that one is called a pilot, but because of his art and his rule over sailors ••• There is something advantageous for each of them ••• And the art is naturally directed toward seeking and providing for the advantage of each (34ld).
But the sort of wages one receives establishes a fundamental difference in the character of artists.

A difference exists between those

artists who work for money and honor and those who work as a penalty.
The first is a reproach, while the other is out of need.
artist (ruler) masters an art out of fear.

The decent

His greatest penalty is to

be controlled by sor.1e worse artist, a less competent one; one deprived,
one with a vice.

Decency, which implies knowledge, compels one to

9

rule.

Money or honor is not an inducement.

Neither desire is present

as part of the decent 1 s natural disposition.

The decent artist's sole

and primary love (desire) is to know the truth.

The wage (price) of

this inherent desire is a sort of penalty, since it compels the decent
to seek some
it.

~igher

truth, although they are not certain of attaining

Other artists' desires are more readily satisried with more tangi-

ble things (money, honor).

The decent ruler, on the other hand, seeks

to secure happiness for the ruled by arranging their lives for the good
of the city.
Also, the art of ruling is not simply a power permitting the
stronger, as some claim, to maintain an advantage over the weaker for
the stronger's benefit.

Plato argues that human fallibility works a-

gainst this propositicn, since strict obedience to all rules of the
stronger can foil any advantage that a ruler may have.
the art then is seen to dissipate.

The power of

But Plato's adversaries object to

this position on the ground that the conduct of the art is fallible,
i.e., the way one performs the art of ruling.
that all arts have is in itself infallible.

They say that the power
In this sense then it can

serve the interests of the stronger over the weaker.
Plat,o' s position is that power may well be infallible, but arts
are not.

They must be as.perfect as possible.

help the weaker.

And as arts they do

He states that art by definition helps that for

which it is an art, for the recipient's advantage.
upon the thing over which it is an art.

But it is dependent

This inferior or weaker thing

becomes the major art's supplementary virtue.

For example, if the

deprivation is bodily illness, the art of medicine plus the body (a
supplementary power) is needed to make the whole. person well.

If the

10
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end is health, the higher art is medicine, and the lower one is the
body, since the former supposedly possesses some sort of knowledge
that the body does not have.
So, the distinction between the higher and lower art forms is
that the higher art is the one directly related to fulfill its purpose.
Medical art's purpose is to cure ill bodies.

It is not the body that

is curing, although i t helps; it is a needed supplement.
To illustrate hierarchy of the arts, Plato maintains that sunlight is a higher art form than the power to see or the power to be
seen, i f the purpose in mind is to make things appear.
illumination to things.

Light gives

Supplementary to this advantage are two other

powers 1) the power to see, residing in the eye and 2) the power to be
seen, residing in things.

Light is the primary virtve.

To make

things illuminant is its specific virtue, while the others, to see and
be seen, help illumination to exist.

All three must work together.

Without either, the primary act, light, would be ineffective.

So no

art tends to be perfect unless it receives this kind of assistance from
other relevant virtues and powers.

So the art of light does not bene-

fit the maker of light or the art, .E!:!_

~'

but rather the one who is

deprived of light, i.e., the weaker (eyes and things).

Similarly, the

art of ruling cares for the ruled, weaker, unruly men, those deprived
of knowledge of what is good for the whole city.
Moreover, to live in a just city is to live in an excellent and
wise one.

But, according to Plato, excellence means something by

which men's performance can be rated.

It is not the ideal.

A good

ruler or doctor knows or understands the problems of one's art, as
best as possible.

One's knowledge and ability can lead to utopia.

11
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Remember, Plato states that his approach is not complete.
ble, but not a probable one.

It is possi-

The steps and the theory behind his aim

consists in large measure in Book VI concerning the 'form of the good.'
The art of ruling can promote justice.

To show that this art can

promote the virtue of justice and that the lack of it can promote the
vice of injustice, Plato gives us the following polemic.

By conces-

sion, the just do not want any advantage over the just, but only over
the unjust ("likes" take advantage over "unlikes," not "likes").

Also,

the unjust want advantage over unjust and the just ("unlikes" take advantage over "likes" and "unlikes").

Further, the unjust desire to

seem good and prudent, while the just do not pretend.
Also, by nature the prudent musical person wants advantage not
over the musical, but the unmusical, while the unmusical, who are
thoughtless, want advantage over both groups.

Likewise, one with

knowledge does not want advantage over the knowledgeable, but only over
the ignorant, who are bad and unlearned.
over both.

The ignorant want advantage

It is conceded that the knowledgeable are good and wise,

<hat the knower and musical are like the just, since neither desire to
take advantage over their likes (kind).

However, the ignorant and un-

musical are like the unjust, since all want to take advantage over
both.
It is conceded that anything good and wise is virtuous, and anything bad and unlearned is a vice.

Therefore, as a result of the a-

bove logic, justice is a virtue and injustice is a vice.
Also, injustice cannot be mightier than justice.
learning is not as mighty as one who is wise and good.
is an ignorant one.

One without
An unjust city

By nature, the unjust city is divided between the

12
best (wise and good) from the worst (bad and unlearned).

It ptoduces

hates and factions between and among men and between the gods.
comes an enemy to oneself and with others.

One be-

Justice, however, which is

wise and good, shows how to make the city (men and gods), friends alike, all working together as one.

So, it alone can accomplish mighty

things.
The just, furthermore, live better and happier lives than the unjust.

Virtue permits a thing to do its work best.

Eyes that cannot

see, i.e., lack the power of sight (virtue) cannot work well.

Things

without its virtue are defective (a vice) and, consequently, work badly.

Likewise, the soul, to work well (manage, deliberate, rule) must

also have its virtue educated.

The better soul is the virtuous one.

Without a defect, it is happy, well and blessed.
soul is wretched.

While the defective

Profit accrues more to the happy soul than to the

wretched one.
Plato's Fundamental Challenge:

Is Justice a Good in Itself?

In the previous analysis, Plato has argued that justice is a good
in itself, i.e., justice is a virtue.

This stand is in opposition to

others who hold that justice is not a good in itself, but is good only
for its consequences.

They maintain that it is a natural good to escape

injustice and a natural evil to suffer injustice.
one's own good consequences.

So one must pursue

The best way to do so is to publicly

praise justice, while privately believing it to be foolish and mad to
be just.
just.

The unjust are satisfied by the consequences. of others being

Vigorous deception insures their endurance of less suffering.

Perfect deception gives the appearance that one is perfectly just and

13
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extremely happy.

It is better to seem just than to be truly just.

Counterfeit justice fares better than legitimate justice in the derived consequences.
Plato is confronted with a fundamental challenge on whether justice is a good in itself.
good consequences.

It is generally believed that justice has

So his task is largely to show'that good and jus-

tice are 'things' in themselves and that they are good.5
In a brief fashion here, but more comprehensively later, Plato
maintains and argues that a person is a microcosm of a city.
soul, as it were, is divided into similar parts as a city.

The
It is

better to see the larger things, and then apply this knowledge to the
smaller (soul).
A city is established to satisfy human needs and wants.
they are numerous, many arts are required.

Since

The principle of the div-

ision of labor compels one to practice one art rather than many.
specialization conforms to one's particular excellence.

This

Besides, by

practicing one art, one can produce better things, faster and more
easily.

Further, arts form a hierarchy of importance in the city.

ruling art resides at the pinnacle.
have properly.

The

The true ,ruler teaches how to be-

The guardianis art must protect this teaching as true

opinion for others to follow.

Finally, the practical artists perform

their functions under the guidance of the ruler's art.
5

One of David Sach's main concerns is whether Plato has really
shown that justice is a good in itself, and the.reby, the just man is
happier than an unjust man. In his "A Fallacy in Plato's Republic,"
Philosophical Review, LXXII (1963), pp. 144-45, he argued that Plato's
conclusion is irrelevant. While Plato tried to show justice's own
good, he really explained how justice can be good for its consequences,
not for its own sake.
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A significant part of the art of ruling is the art of education.
It is designed to give advantages over that which it is an art, namely,
soldiers and artisans.

Its purpose is to develop another's virtue so

one can benefit the city as well as oneself (wage).

One of the first

duties of education is to remove false doctrines, namely, the odious
myths espoused by prominent poets particularly on the nature of gods,
content and style of speech, and so on.

Having done this task,

Plato believes that the soul will be properly (good) disposed to see
virtues and vices in things and in themselves.

The forms of virtue/

vice first must be seen in things and then as they are in themselves,
later.

One cannot recognize the form, tree, in water as a tree, un-

less one first sees a tree.

CHAPTER III
EXTERNAL JUSTICE
Emergence of the City
Plato's previous theoretical view of justice.was clearly unconvincing to Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, Glaucon and Adeimantus.

While he

argued the just man is stronger, mightier and happier than the unjust,
they still remained unpersuaded that justice, in itself, makes one
good, and injustice, one bad.
Of what profit in justice itself to man who possesses it, and what
harm does injustice do (367d2-3)?
Admittedly, Plato remarks that understanding justice is no ordinary task.

It requires sharpness.

sense, i.e., in the city.
or resides in each man.

It is best to see it in the large

Then, one can more readily see how it works
"Being unclever men, it will be like a god-

send to read its bigger letters first'' (368d).

Since a city is larger,

it will be easier to observe it closely, and, then place the "likeness
of the bigger (city) into the idea of the littler (man)" (369a).

One

will then be more able to see what the just man is.
Plato discusses the reasons why a city is founded.

It begins by

the insufficiency of one man to satisfy one's needs well (369b).
come together as partners, one helping the other.

Men

Moreover, since

one's needs are many (food, shelter, clothing and complements), many
arts and artists are also required.

Further, since men are naturally

different, each man should practice one art.

"Different men are apt

(disposed) for the accomplishment of different jobs" (370b).
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advantages associated with this natural division of labor, e.g., ease,
speed and quality of production, follow from man's innate dlfferences.
Especially during crucial times, for one to do several arts, the vital
needs of the partnership may not be fulfilled, consequently, ruining
circumstances for all (370c).

So, in this sense, a true, healthy city,

in part, is sort of an economic arrangement between men, where they exchange their production and labor for the good of the whole city
(371e3-5).
But, what are the mechanics of the exchange?

"It was for just

this reason that we made an arrangement and founded a city" (37lb3).
To know how exchanges can take place well, Plato suggests one can see
how justice comes to be.

But he seems to have been diverted from not

discussing justice's emergence in a healthy city.

Rather, he is moved

to discuss how a luxurious, feverish city begins.

"But, if you (Glau-

con) want to, let's look at a feverish city, too" (372e4).
that is unsatisfactory, i.e., containing unnecessary things.

It is one
The de-

sire for luxuries requires more people, which means more land, which
means unlimited appropriation, and ultimately war (373e7).
Character of the Guardian's Disposition
War is a natural consequence of a luxurious (bad, unhealthy)
city.

And, the struggle for victory is an art like other arts, except

it is a higher one.

It protects the other arts' preservation (374e).

Moreover, to win wars requires effective guardians.

To be a, good

guardian, besides sole possessor of weapons, Plato maintains that one
roust be endowed with certain natural qualities.

The guardian must be

a) spirited (thymos), b) gentle and c) philosophic.
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Spiritedness at that time was defined as the "principle or seat
of anger or rage. 11 6

Plato states that it disposes the soul. to be

"fearless and invincible to everything" (375b2).

A guardian must be

gentle to one's own people (friends) and savage (spirited) to one's
enemies (375c).

Plato acknowledges that each notion is directly op-

posed to the other one.

Yet, he believes it is possible for them to

reside and to operate in one nature.

He gives the illustration of the

noble dog who is "gentle" with familiars and "savage" with those whom
it does not know (375e2-3).

A philosophic guardian possesses a power

to distinguish between a friend from a foe.

This feat is accomplished

by a disposition which inclines him to recognize a friend and disinclines him from others.7
it ignorance.

The absence of this disposition brings with

Presumably, to be ignorant of anything means that some-

thing is alien to one's natural disposition.

In effect, a good guard-

ian is generally disposed (is turned), to friends and undisposed or ignorant (turned away) from enemies (376b3).

In effect, any disposition

.!!S.>! mirroring what one thinks a friend is is an enemy.

Plato, unfortu-

nately, makes no comment on neutrals.

6

See Alan Bloom's transliteration of the word, "thymos," in the
author's The Republic of Plato (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1968),
fn. 33, p. 449.
7
Karl R. Popper raises an interesting question on this point. In
his The_Open Society and Its Enemies (Princeton, N. J.: Prin~eton University Press, 1963), 2 Vols.; Vol. I, pp. 51-52, he is puzzled over how
Plato's fierce and gentle guardians will not be prone to attack each
other. In the end, it must be a matter of self-control, since the
artisan cannot restrain them. Popper is unconvinced that this sort of
guardian self-restraint is really possible. To Popper, Plato's explanation is questionable.
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To explain what is meant by a "disposition to or from something,"
Plato again uses the "noble dog" example.

"Without knowledge or a bad

experience," the dog will get angry (spirited) at someone or even with
one's hostile looks.

It turns against that person.

On the other hand,

"wi.th some knowledge and no good experience," the dog is gentle with
others.

It turns towards them.

In the first instance, the dog is ig-

norant of that kind of "look," because, presumably, its disposition
does not "mirror" it.

The look is alien to the dog's good disposition,

and, somehow, it thinks the image an enemy.

But, in the second case,

the dog, using some sort of knowledge (intuitive, perhaps) looks at an
external object and thinks it mirrors what is its good disposition
(376b2).

Both seem akin to one another, and, hence, the dog believes

the object to be a friend.
its behavior.

Good or bad experiences are not crucial to

What is crucial is whether a dog--or a human being--can

judge what is its

~

according to its good disposition.

one will love to learn whatever it mirrors as its own.

If one can,
Plato con-

eludes:
So shall we be bold and assert that a human being too, if he is
going to be gentle to his own and those known to him, must by
nature be a philosopher and a lover of learning (376bc)?
Glaucon agrees, and Plato concludes further:
Then the man who's going to be a fine and good guardian of the
city for us will be in his nature philosophic, spirited and
gentle (376bc).
In effect, Plato has stated that a guardian must be spirited with
enemies and gentle with friends.

Although both qualities are directly

opposed to one another, it is possible for them to be parts of the same
nature or soul.

Moreover, the ability to distinguish between friend
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and foes resides in another part, the philosophic.

Then the whole na-

ture is characterized as having a "good disposition."

If an object

sensed, mirrors one's good disposition, the thing is a friend.
does not, the object is an enemy.
in reaching this judgment.

If it

Experience plays little or no part

But, essentially Plato fails to adequately

explain the specific difference between knowledge and experience.

Why

does he dismiss environmental experiences out of hand as inconsequential
"conditioners" in developing character traits?

Feeding a noble, but

hungry dog, whether one 'mirrors' or does not 'mirror' its good disposition may well be more of a gratification for the dog than trying to
"decide" whether the feeder is friend or foe.

So it still remains to

be determined by Plato what the nature of the good disposition is.

At

this point, we know it is sort of an "intuitive tool," in a sense 1 by
which one, either, cooperates or competes with another, depending on
whether 'the other' is perceived as friend or foe.

This is all we know

so far.
Plato's "Educational" Content:

Censorship, Deception and Propaganda

While a good disposition may be innate, to a large extent, it is
to be developed by Plato's notion of education.

He asserts that a gen-

eral review of the art of education will not deter him from making his
innnediate point, namely, to show how justice and injustice come to be.
"The present consideration (art of education) will contribute to that
end" (376d3).
The essential nature of Plato's educational system consists mainly of two parts:

1) music, which includes melodic, verbal (speech) and

rational content for the soul and 2) gymnastic, i.e., tension exercises
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for the body.

And, by convention, music precedes gymnastics for the

very young (377a7-8).
Plato observes that the nature of the young soul is very malleable.

Because the soul easily assimilates what it receives sensually,

no child should hear any tale or opinion (377b2).

Only approved ones

are permitted for "these tender things ears" (377c?·

The implication

is given to us that the potential guardian, although disposed philosophically, can quite easily modify or have altered this inherent disposition.

Their malleability tends to induce Plato to shelter the

young from unapproved opinion.

To this extent then one should be con-

cerned with the strength or depth of a "philosophical" disposition.
The young must not believe Achilles was confused over two opposite
diseases 1) love of money and 2) arrogant disdain for gods and
men •••• Otherwise ••• (39lc4-5)
Plato maintains such an opinion would encourage in the young a
"strong proclivity to badness" (392a).

From this point of view, it

seems that a philosophical or a good disposition is a rather fragile,
tenuous human characteristic, which must warrant Plato's censorship
program, if he is to achieve just ends.
For example, Plato believes some of the opinions of Hesiod and
Homer on warring gods are not for the ears of the young guardian.

Gods

to them are largely represented as murderers, revengers, ·and so on.
While conceding some accusations may be true, their telling, if made at
all, should be professed to a select few, presumably, the older and
more philosophically educated.

They will know how to justify divine

anger, rage or warfare among the gods.

But, for the young, these are

"unspeakable secrets" and bad lies that can cause harm to the city's
\

harmony or cooperation (378a4).

Men, especially young men, tend to
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emulate their heroes.

Quarreling heavenly gods then will induce con-

flicts within the cities.

They can encourage the youth to become eas-

ily upset, angry and uncomfortable with oneself and with another, vicious and most shameful conduct.

Such behavior is extremely difficult to

alter or remove, especially when one gets older (378c2).

But some lies,

on the other hand, are good, if they bind the city' together, e.g.,
Phonecian lies, mating game tricks (414c3).
So, the primary duty of a founder of an "ideal city" is to find
ways to bind its members together, i.e., to establish a good pattern.
His theory of the nature of the gods can work to this end.

Since gods

are things to be emulated, they, again, must be presented largely as
cooperative beings.

Plato asserts anything that cooperates with one

another establishes a good pattern, and gods do.

They are good in

themselves, and nothing good is harmful or can cause evil.

They can

only benefit the city and are not the cause of the many bad things.
Certainly, Plato can be charged with being doctrinaire, for he offers
no evidence at this point to justify the gods' intrinsic goodness and
their consequent "good" effects.

Despite this weak argument, whi.ch

borders more on faith than reason, he receives a universal and uncontested acclamation, "of course what you say is true" from Adeimantus
and the others (379b3).

Again, it appears to be in Plato 1 s advantage

to state that gods are good and cooperate with one another, since it
is their conduct that will be eventually emulated by his citizens.
Plato's regime, like most others, requires this sort of harmony.
But, Plato makes an exception to the rule prohibiting
from hearing heavenly quarrels.

th~

young

The "Sorrows of the Pelopidae" and

the "Trojan Sorrows," for example, are justifiable causes of gods'
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.angers that all should know.

He maintains that the punishment associ-

ated with that anger profited men.

I

Men were wretched.

penalty, they were profited and benefited (380b4-6).

By paying the
This instance,

however, is the extent of Plato's elaboration on this exception.

ne

avoids giving us the middle term as to what sort of popular wretchedness was deemed evil and punishable and which was riot.

Either his

listeners were convinced that gods can cause justifiable harm or they
were becoming docile.

Adeimantus and the others give "their vote" to

the exception as correct (380c4).
In addition, Plato characterizes the nature of the gods.

They

do not deceive or change their "own form to many shapes" (380d3).
claim is that gods are in the best condition, naturally.
this

condition~

they possess virtue and beauty.

His

Because of

Anything i.n best con-

dition, by nature or art, will then possess these god-like qualities.
A well ....built house is a work of art.
most difficult to transform.

It is in the best condition and

Art produces a house's virtue.

But a

soul is courageous and prudent, moreso by nature than by art, say for
example, education, if it is disposed this way.

Plato's creeping

doctrinairism seems to have overwhelmed his listeners (38la4).

Again

no supportable evidence was shed to justify his major premise that "all
gods are in the best condition."

As a result of having no opposition,

Plato is free to conclude that nothing in best condition will transform
or deceive willingly.

Any alteration must be, of necessity, a worse

kind, i.e., lacking by degrees in virtue and beauty.

Gods, then, are

simple, not of mixed shapes, and seldom departs from its own idea
(380cd6).
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Concerning deception, Plato maintains gods and humans hate "true
lies."

They are concerned with the "most sovereign things," namely

a) things that are and b) things to be unlearned.
soul ignorant.
affection.

True lies make the

Ignorance is a phantom or imitation of a soul's real·

The soul is deceived on what it truly desires and is dis-

posed to or for which it has an affection (382b9).·
These are truly a lie ••• the ignorance of the soul of the man who
has been lied to. For the lie in speeches is a kind ·of imitation
of the affection in the soul, a phantom of it that comes into
being after it (382b8-9).
In effect, ignorance is having something which one should not possess.
It is not the lack of something, e.g., a void or nothing.

It is having

the wrong thing for which the soul has no affection or disposition.
And, since true lies cause this form of deception "of the most sovereign things," they are hated by men and gods.
However, some lies are not hated by men, if they are useful or
bind the city together.

Usefulness emerges, if it deters anyone from

banning the city, usually done by "private men."

These lies can act

as a drug against a madman or a remedy for a ruler (389b).

It can

liken itself to the truth on "ancient things" (things sovereign) on
which .!!.£. one has any real knowledge.
And, in the telling of tales we're just now speaking about •••
those told because we don't know where the truth about ancient
things lies ••• likening the lie to the truth as best we can •••
(382d3)

The lie encourages men to follow one set of ideas (lies) over another,
say for example, Plato's over Homer's.
suaded by it.

It is useful, if one is per-

Plato's must be more convincing than Homer's.

All of

this reasoning assumes that the true teacher is closer to the truth
than another teacher, since all men lack full knowledge.

Gods, how-
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ever, have no such problem.
use for them to lie.

They hate all lies, because it is of no

They fear no madmen and know all things.

"it would be ridiculous for them to lie" (382de).

So,

To conclude, Plato

tells us that no man knows the truth, men can lead us to it, and men
who have an insight into it (as Plato feels he has) should overpower
others by the education he is apparently employing.

In the end, then,

lying is derived out of fear of an enemy and/or a lack of knowledge on
what the truth is and aimed at binding a city together.
While Plato concedes that the full truth cannot be known, some
"right" men must be induced to become courageous defenders of what
seems at least truthful.

He maintains courage is developed if the

terror associated with Hades be abandoned.

As it is, one would rather

choose defeat or slavery than fearless fighting or death for the just
regime (386ac).

Hades is a place to be praised, not feared.

It is

where men ought to be rewarded for their courage, not punished for
their lack of it.

But, no objective insight is given to show why the

traditional notion of Hades be abandoned.

It seems that abandonment

is to suit the purpose of the regime, namely, fearless protection of

.

•t 8

]_

It is somewhat like saying fight with utter savageness, for you

will be saved--one is fighting for the just city!

Yet Plato offers no

evidence at this point to support "the prophecy" or "the abandonment."
One must almost obliviously go against Greek tradition and culture and
8

Ibid., p. 166.

Here Popper comments on Plato's "clean slate"

notion.~e eradication of existing institutions and traditions, the

great purge, is certainly an uncompromising attitude of Plato's, an
act of radicalism, Popper contends. He suggests that a society to be
likened to a work of art can lead to the most violent measures.
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and follow the dictates of the present sage.

Is this a sound educa-

tional appeal?
Further, to reinforce this aspect, Plato urges that no famous,
decent man, e.g., Achilles, should lament over the death or misfortunes
of another decent comrade (388a4).
thing" (388a4).

"Being dead is not a terrible

One is decent (epieikes), i f one is self-sufficient,

lives well and has least need of others" (387e).
should be borne gently, then.
losses.

Most misfortunes

Only the bad, unserious cry over such

However, in terms of the "partnership" alluded to earlier

where each helps another, Plato seems to be implying the decent are
justifiably less partners.

Should only the bad or unserious, i.e.,

the deviants of the regime, be compelled to form close ties with the
city?

It seems that the duty to cooperate as partners rests moreso

with the less decent.

Their self-sufficiency is not that assured.

They are unable to be independent, whereas the decent are.

This in-

equality suggests that the burden of cooperativeness largely is the
duty of the less decent, which, in turn, infers they also have less
political freedom than the decent possess.
Educational Style
Turning away from content for awhile, Plato holds, as another
part of his educational art, speeches must be presented in proper verbal
style.

Simple narrative styles are permitted, since the poet, for ex-

ample, takes no part in a character's disposition.
it were, speaks for oneself.

Each character, as

A listener, say, a young guardian, is less

confused over whether the poet or the character is "serious or not."
On the other hand, Plato claims when a poet speaks as though he
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were someone else, i.e., as the character, the poet's style is likened
to the character portrayed.

Two persons, in a sense, become one,

which can easily lead to a confused education for a potential guardian.
To liken oneself in voice and looks is the same as imitating the
one he likens himself to (393c).
For example, Homer speaks as though he were Chryses in the Iliad.
via Chryses, begs Agamemnon to ransom his daughter.

He,

So, Homer, a famous

man, is represented as one who believes it right to beg and to ransom.
To a young educatee, Plato believes, one would find it difficult to separate Homer from Chryses' image.

Further, even a guardian could not

separate Homer (the famous man) from Chryses' calling on the gods to
curse himself for a specific fault (393a).

To Plato, then, these char-

acter representations are undesirable examples for the guardian's educational development.

One suspects, however, a high degree of intellec-

tual shallowness of the guardian, especially, if he is unable to distinguish between the personal beliefs of the narrator and the character
in the narration.

This sort of shallowness speaks poorly of the intel-

lectual credentials of Plato's rulers, who do, in fact, emerge from the
guardian class.

Will they know what is good for the city?

Moreover, he maintains that the act of imitating several persons
or arts is not fitting for anyone to do.

It goes against the principle.

that each could do a fine job only in one techne, not many,
otherwise, one would fail in all. ••• (394e) Human nature is
minted in small coins (395b2).
So, since the guardian's techne is to protect, one should not be encumbered by other imitations or arts.

Even if the art is closely akin to

another, one is prohibited from practic.ing both.
be a comedic poet (395b).

A tragic poet must not

One's job is to imitate or practice what is
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one's proper and own disposition.

For the guardian, it is a life of

virtue, e.g., moderation, courage, holiness, and so on (395c3).

But,

for the rest of the regime, i.e., the multitude, their dispositions are
mixed and many, an unfortunate, but common characteristic.

The "more

common one is (more variously one is disposed) the more one will imiJ

tate most anything from horses to thunder, thinking nothing unworthy
of

onesel~"

pattern.

(397a2).

A common person is not disposed in any strict

At this point, although it is unexplained how the guardian/

ruler differs from the artisan ••• a mere assertion begs the real question.

Plato believe·s that while many modes or rhythms will please more

people, it tends to disunite the regime •. More than two basic modes in
the regime or in the person will fracture both.

The regime must con-

tain a mode for voluntary, peaceful conduct and a violent mode for courage against its enemies (399c).

Blending of both will tend to make

all moderately disposed, a characteristic to be developed especially by
the multitude.
Most imitations please them.

This pleasure, however, is derived

not from' any special influence of anything innate, Plato maintains.
nature, one dominant disposition exists per man.
posed) to perform one task.

By

Each man is apt (dis-

One is legitimately pleased,

~lato

contends,

if that dominant leaning is developed to its potential by an art, especially.

Art focuses the energy, if you will, of a particular ability

to move in a single direction, not in any skewed pattern.

But, he

feels, the multitude lack art in general, and specifically, the art of
education.

Consequently, their endowment goes virtually undeveloped,

and in the meantime, their other propensities or desires overcome or
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submerge the real one.

In such a case, no single disposition (endow-

ment, propensity) is the first among many.
another time, B; then C, and so on.

At one time, A may be;

Consequently, more 'unreal' plea-

sures appear concerning more things on more occasions.
not unworthy to imitate dogs or wind."

"One thinks it

Moreover, since the multi-

tude's dispositions are so skewed and pitched with.ups and downs, they
promote extremes in the just regime, and no extreme is tolerated.
of it is unlawful.

All

While anything encouraging moderation is lawful.

Plato's music does just this, he contends:
there is rearing in music" (402a5).

"So far all these reasons

But, Plato continues to fail to

show the basic distinction between the "many" and the "few" especially
when reflecting upon his comments on the few's weak, malleable and tenuous 'philosophic' character.
The purpose of his music, he continues, is to "impress an image
of the good disposition" (40lb2).
being reared on bad grass.

Impressing bad dispositions is Hke

However, to become receptive for the image

requires a personal endowment which knows what is fine, graceful and
beneficial (40lc5).

This gift again is that good disposition.

And

music is sovereign because it 'takes hold' of the soul's innermost
parts and permits the good disposition (endowment) to see the "image"
being impressed.

Lastly, all of this process precedes anyone grasping

"reasonable speech," i.e., the dialectic.

Language development, to

Plato, comes somewhat later, although both are akin to one another
(402a5).
In effect, the soul of the guardian, moreso than anyone else's,
is by nature receptive (disposed, endowed) to the image musi.c educa-
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tion impresses upon it.
the image.

If it is properly disposed, it will receive

If not, it will turn away from Plato's music.

Although

Plato innundates us with the mechanics of the process, at this point,
he, however, has managed to beg the real question, namely, what makes
the "image" impressed the best one for the young guardian or, for that
matter, anyone?
The Nature of the Competent Man's

Reasonin~

He partially answers the above question when describing a competent musical person.

Competence exists if one is able to "read a few

letters (large or small) anywhere (402b).

To explain the letter A, for

example, is to say the letter A is in whatever form or medium it displaces, e.g., sand, shadows of A, and so on.

At first, however, it

must be known as a letter A, before it can be recognized as the letter
A anywhere.

It must be named an A.

It must have certain characteris-

tics that only A's have, i.e., its own description.

This same analysis

holds for any sequence of letters that represent things.

"They, the

letters, didn't escape us in any combinations they turn up" (402b).
Further, Plato claims the image of writing represents a thing
(402b4).
tree.

For example, the writing, TREE, is an image of an actual

To know both the writing or the image in any medium or form

(paper, shadow), one must first recognize the actual thing, i.e., a
tree.

Like the A, the thing is named a Tree, and is described like

all things in common.
We wouldn't recognize them (images) before knowing things themselves ••• And both the thing and image is a part of the same art
and discipline (402b5-6).
In effect, this skill implies an ability to recognize a tree in
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different
Y and

z,

~laces.

If one knows this thing, treeness, is in places X,

one is said to have identified something common in all trees

in all locations at any time, whatever the form or medium a particular
tree displaces.

So, if

th~

form of Tree A is an actual tree, Tree B is

an image of A and Tree C is the writing T R E E of Tree B, all three
trees represent the idea of treeness.

This idea of treeness is pecu-

liar to trees alone.
Plato carries this example one step further to intangible concepts.

A musical man is competent also if one can identify the forms

of the virtues and vices everywhere, i.e., in whatever form (in themselves, in things, in images) and likewise believe that all are part of
the same art and discipline (402c).

To recognize courage (like tree-

ness), it must be known, ideally, in itself first.

But since, it is an

intangible, the second choice is to know it in things, then images,
Plato suggests,

But in whatever medium or form courage displaces, one

who is still competent in music, is able to recognize it.

But is Mr.

Artisan a courageous man, if he behaves or reflects courage in his way
or Plato 1 s?

Presumably it is Plato's courage that sets a guardian a-

part from the artisan.

But this distinction is yet unclear.

Plato's Gymnastic Theory of Education
Turning to Plato's second part of his educational system, namely,
exercise for the body, he endorses the Asclepuisian notion.

Besides

having simple diets, easily prepared and boiled food, the Asclepusians
say the greatest cause of illness is idleness.

He believed that the

Asclepiod era was a healthy time and a healthy city and presumably
just.

Men were compelled to work at certain tasks (406cl-4).

No
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craftsman was permitted nor desired to be sick for a long time.
is incurable, one returns to work until death comes.

If one

It is of no pro-

fit to oneself or to the city, if one remains sickly idle (407a).

More-

over, excessive body care inhibits learning and the proper practice of
one's art.

If conventional prescribed drugs prove ineffective, living

with a sick body profits no one (408b4).
Following this advice, Plato is intolerant of those who are ill
most of the time.
work.

If a disease is not cured, one should resume one's

Again, Plato's principle is that the regime is harmed by idle or

ill men, ostensibly because it burdens others by decreasing the quantity and quality of goods and labor.

A sick farmer, judge, ruler de-

creases their arts' advantages to the regime as a whole.

Besides the

weakness for not allowing for research or experimentation to perfect
the art of medicine, further, Plato's intolerance of the grave legiti··
mately ill is another aspect of an intimidating domestic policy.

He

seems to escape this charge for he states that a good craftsman
will voluntarily say goodbye to a doctor, return to own home cures,
and continue to work until he dies •••• He then is rid of his
troubles (406e).
But such a comment is derived from the presumption that the Asclepusians
were healthy and just.

He gives us virtually no evidence to support

this claim.9
9

In A. D. Lindsay's The Republic of Plato (New York: E. P. Dutton,
1957), p. xxiv, the author suggests that, while Plato was influenced by
the Asclepian school of medicine, neither Plato nor the Athenian assemblies recognized particular authorities concerning questions on remedying problems of human behavior. Previous speculative sciences indeed
brought no certain conclusions or added value to life, although Plato
implies that the Asclepian medical technique could be applied to the
Greeks' social affairs.
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In addition, the city's doctors and lawyers must be well trained
at an early age.

It is not a detriment for a doctor (like it is for

a judge) to be of ill health and still practice one's art well.
tor treats ill bodies with his knowledge of illness.

A doc-

In fact, it is

best for one to experience all diseases to practice one's art well.
This example is the extent of Plato's endorsement of objective research.

One's body is the source of one's knowledge for the

of the art of medicine.

~erfection

This assumption leads to an apparent inconsis-

tency concerning Plato's earlier statement, where he indicated ''prolonged illnesses tend to inhibit learning and the proper practice of
one's art" (407ab).

For one to experience all diseases (or even the

bulk of them) and to properly learn from this encounter seems, somewhat
superhuman; in the meantime, one is still required to cure the diseases
of others in the regime!

Even assuming the possibility of such "great"

doctoral feats in medicine, one wonders why Plato discredits the potential contributions of other artisans (shoemakers, farmers, etc.) who
belong to the same class as doctors.

In any event, his essential point

is that a doctor with an ill body makes for an advantage for the medical art, assuming one's soul is well.

A good soul, in the final analy-

sis, rules over ill bodies.
On the other hand, in the case of the judge's art, a different
situation exists.

Here, the judge's soul.rules another's soul.

one (a virtuous one) treats an ill soul (one with vice).

A good

So, no taint

of injustice must accompany the education of the young judge's soul.
"A good judge has no pattern of bad affections" (409b).
late in knowing what injustice is.

One uses one's

One must be

knowledg~

of injus-

tice later in life, not like the doctor using one's personal experiences

r
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of illness as an aid to treat disease (a vice).
In effect, Plato is saying both, doctor and judge, must have good
souls, each disposed to his particular techne.

Both rule with them:

one over ill bodies; the other over ill souls.

Besides the obvious

difference in their objects, the potential judge's. soul differs also in
being more prone, it seems, to be tainted by vice, if exposed to it
early.

The young doctor has no such problem when one's soul is so ex-

posed.

Plato makes no contrary assertion.

This paradox raises an in-

teresting question, in that, why should a judge's soul be more affected
by its vice than a doctor's by its?

Plato takes great pain to prevent

the judge from being influenced by the object of the thing one is to
rule or change, namely, injustice.

Whereas, with the doctor, one is in

the "heat of battle," so to speak.

Perhaps a partial answer to this

dilemma is that it seems that men's souls are disposed less to intangible realities, e.g., the virtues and vices.

They are more vulnerable

or unsure of their art's particular advantages than men disposed to
medicine, carpentry, and the like.

The latter see disease being cured,

houses being built.

The former, however, continue to see more bad than

good men, and so on.

So, to be less shaken in their faith associated

with learning to rule well, one must avoid the unjust world until one's
pattern of Plato's justice is molded in one's soul first.

They are

innocent and easily deceived by unjust men, because they have no affection similar to those of bad men (409b2).
tion closely associated with the behavior
teachers who seclude aspiring
In addition, both music
soul.

Exercise alone produces savageness.

But is not cloisterism a no-
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Savageness is derived from the spirited part of one's nature.
it is trained with music, the spirited becomes courageous.
defend what is good or advantageous for the city.

But, if

It will

Likewise, as tame-

ness comes from the philosophic part, with exercise, it becomes orderly besides.

The balance between savagery (tension) and tameness (re-

laxation) produces courageous, moderate man (4lla).

All of this anal-

ysis suggests, in effect, the good guardian must love the city.

Love

for anything exists when one believes one thing is an advantage to the
thing and oneself.
steady one.

This love (conviction, opinion, belief) must be a

But, again, it all hinges on more than what Plato has

said, namely, why will his city make men just and happy?
Finally, Plato finds a dubious way (like the Phoenicians) to explain natural dispositions or differences in men.

It is the noble lie

which, if believed, tells how one is fashioned or educated in one's own
peculiar way (414b7).
tion.

No person is really responsible for one's educa-

All education took place before birth and the way one is now is

how one basically should be.10

If one is a rul~r, one should rule.

If

a farmer, one should farm.
While, in truth, at that time they were under the earth within,
being fashioned and reared themselves, and their arms and other
tools being crafted. Everyone are siblings too (414el-3).

10

In B. Jowett and Lewis Campbell's Plato's Republic (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1894), p. 158, it somewhat endorses the Myth of the
Metals. They suggest that Plato means to intimate that almost any new
fable may be rendered credible over time. The "Metal Myth" (noble lie)
is not more improbable than the old one was at first or the old one more
true than the new. In effect, any ruler of a new regime especially must
be taken into one's confidence. It is essentially an act of faith that
the ruled must manifest for the ruler's opinions.

r
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Plato's concern here is that men who rule should perhaps rule, but they
are practicing the ruling art improperly, i.e., unjustly.

But Plato

opens two questions that are unanswered as of yet 1) is the lie a
credible tool for ruling well and 2) what is the 'just 1 way to rule?
Nature and the Efl°ect of Common Ownership of Prope·rty
Since Plato previously advocated common ownership of property, he
must show why private ownership will interfere with one's happiness.
Normally, men are considered happy if they are permitted to possess
gold, houses, and the like.

His guardians, for example, are prevented

from owning anything, privately.

They can only share the essential

things in common, e.g., food, men or women, shelter.11
But for them alone of those in the city, it is not lawful to handle
gold and silver. And whenever they'll possess private land,
houses, and currency, they'll be housebuilders, farmers and (traders) instead of guardians, and they'll become masters and enemies
of other citizens, not allies, all of which will rush to the
city's destruction (417ab).
To answer the question, he further declares:
It is not suitable for guardians to possess gold or property. When
a new city is begun it is like painting a new picture. The fairest
colors go on the fairest parts. Each part possess an .a.ttribute
that suits it best. Each has its own art and assigned its share of
happiness (42lbc).

11

We know that Plato abolished the family system and endorses the
regulation of reproductive practices especially for the guardian class.
His purpose is mainly to breed better citizens mainly for political
stability. H. D. P. Lee states, however, in his Plato, The Republic
(Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin, 1958), p. 42, that these sorts of prohibitions are self-defeating. While Plato sees family loyalty as a
distraction to proper uniformity in a community, Lee claims that only
by strengthening family ties will a community become strong. He argues
that greater community loyalty draws its strength from smaller ones
(families) which it contains.
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Obviously, these declarations beg the question:
property?

Why no private

Being somewhat ambiguous, he argues that private possession

is the main cause of extreme wealth and poverty which, in turn, is the
leading influence for corruption and producing bad men.
Take the craftsmen and consider whether wealth and poverty corrupt
and make men bad (442d).
The rich potter becomes less diligent, it is believed.

Wealth is the

cause of idleness, carelessness and, in the end, one becomes a bad
potter.

On the other hand, a poor potter, lacking adequate tools, will

produce shoddy pots.
Then from both poverty and wealth, the product of one's art and men
themselves become worse (42le2-3).
He concludes then that the guardian who may own things will also
tend to corrupt himself.

But is the analogy between the potter's cor-

ruption and the guardian's a proper one?

It seems Plato is comparing

apples to oranges.

The guardian, supposedly, is a 'cut above' the or-

dinary money-maker.

In view of being of better stock, the same things

(private property) may not have such a corrupting influence as it has
on the 'poorer stock.'

In addition, Plato's assessment that "men be-

come bad in themselves" leaves something to be wanting, despite the
agreement by "the others," who docilely assent, repeatedly:
That too, by far ••• It looks like it ••• " (42lde).

"By far •••

Perhaps, largely by

experience, they have encountered rich, idle, careless men, and poor,
illiberal men.
liberal.

But, some rich are not idle, and some poor, not il-

Plato unfortunately neglects to discuss these rather impor-

taut exceptions.

Instead, he, in a way, prefers to play upon "their"

conventional psychology, .!.£wit:

Poverty and wealth corrupt.

Both
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may corrupt men.

But, Plato in charging poverty and wealth as univer-

sal culprits, indeed, omits an obligation to explain, at least, why in
some or perhaps in most cases, they do not.
In view of advocating neither wealth or poverty for his city, he
implies a regime consists of a broad economic class.
regime.

It is a moderate

Moderate regimes, Plato contends further, 'can successfully de-

fend and even make war against wealthy ones.

His guardians are so

trained to be "champions in the art of war."

He argues, if a fat boxer

can easily fight against two, fat, non-boxers, a champion guardian
could easily resist a wealthy enemy (422bc).

His assumption is that a

wealthy regime's soldiers will be careless, fat and lazy, forever doomed by wealth's corrupting influence.

One wonders if his foreign policy

is not a f rivalous one.
But, to offset such an objection, he claims further that an extremely wealthy city is essentially many cities that can pose no real
threat to a moderate one.
ones and poor ones.

A wealthy city is really many cities, rich

Having this sort of aggregate, Plato calls for the

military tactic of "subdividing and conquering" (423a4).

That is to

say, offer money and power of the rich to the poor, if the poor would
ally with Plato's regime.

Gaining adherents for Plato's cause can

emerge easily, if they know his domestic policy of economics, namely,
"All property is shared in common, and war is justified, if one citizen
keeps the property of others" (422dl-2).

By this persuasion, Plato

believes it would fragment the wealthy regime and, in the end, enlarge
his city with newer devotees.
He warns us, however, that a proper proportion must prevail be-
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tween land availability and population size.

If one or the other is

disproportionate, one or the other must be let go (423b5).

A city, for

example, can have too much land, confiscated or otherwise.

A moderate

city is one which is one and sufficient.
Each person must be brought to that which naturally fits him, one
man, one art. One artist must not produce many arts. Likewise
the whole city will naturally grow as one, not· many (423dl--4).
He further declares a city is sufficient if the guardians protect the
"one, great sufficient thing," namely, their education and rea:ring
(423e3).

It will produce sensible men who believe in the old proverb,

"friends have all things in common (424a).

It will permit a regime to

grow circularly; sound education produces good natures, which, in turn,
produce better education, and so on.

So, in the final analysis, it

allows for innovation, especially in music and gymnastics, nor any new
praises or many laws.

The "great sufficient thing 11 makes gentle men,

and makes what is good self-evident.

The guardian and Apollo must pro-

tect and preserve what has been founded (427c6).
Conceivably, Plato's delicate land-population balance could quite
easily lead to a fierce foreign policy.

His premise is that the land

to people ratio must be such as to work for the advantage of the whole
city.

And any disproportion most likely would make a city weak.

For

example, a sudden or even slow land surplus/insufficiency or population
explosion/decrease, can make the city vulnerable to poverty or wealth.
A surplus of land tends to lead to more appropriation and speculation
by the immoderate, money-maker (artisan) class.

Similarly, an increase

in population alone leads to high unemployment, and, hence, poverty.
Given these implications from his premise, Plato seems to suggest ostra-
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cism or confiscation to remedy either the surplus or unemployment problems.

Earlier, one learns that conquest and confiscation is more

desirable than ostracism (37337).
Concerning the question of dampening the desires of the (artisan)
money-maker, Plato seems to apply the idea of "sufficiency" as a remedial measure.

While generally the craftsmen seek self-satisfaction,

Plato believes his educational policy over time will produce the better
natures, which will, in turn, make for a better policy.

Education is

seen largely as an ongoing, progressive art, limited to the extent it
becomes innovative.

This restriction, however, is the crucial concern.

When does education become innovative?

No apparent insight is given to

explain this dilemma, except, he states, when it disrupts his music or
gymnastics.

But much of this argumentation rests upon earlier subtle

or tenuous presupositions.
Is the City Virtuous?
At this point in the discussion, Plato asserts his city has essentially been founded.
founded" (427c6).

"So, now, son of Ariston, your city would now be

He admits, however, a large task has yet to be com-

pleted, namely, is it just, unjust, is there a difference between the
two, and which promotes happiness?
He begins with a theoretical blueprint, as it were, on what a
correctly founded city is and then compares the "blueprint" with the one
he established.

First, he asserts a correct city must be perfectly

good, that is, it must be wise, courageous, moderate and just.
course, these are the virtues he previously discussed.

Of

In a sense,

he seemed to have predetermined what a city is at the outset of the
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Republi~,

argued about these notions, and believes that the discussion

was valid.

Secondly, to learn whether they are present in his city, he

plays, as it were, a 'marbles game,' pretending the four virtues are
like marbles.

The purpose of the game is to find the "justice marble."

If it were found first, the game ends.

But, if the other three marbles

were recognized at first, the remaining marble would have to be recognized as the "justice one."

So, by this technique of elimination, he

intends to recognize justice in the city.
Apparently the justice marble cannot be recognized at the outset, so he is forced to look for another.
st:rangely

,~ough,

"it is of good counsel."

He looks into the city and
It is wise, because it con-

tains a special kind of knowledge, by which men counsel well.
though it has many sorts of knowledge, e.g., farming,

Al-

carpentry~

this

special knowledge is geared to "how a city as a whole best deals with
itself and other cities" (428dl-2).

Moreover, it belongs to a few

citizens (true guardians), mainly because their knowledge is special,
i.e. , it deals with the whole city and all its parts (l12831-2).

So,

the smallest class (wisdom) has the ability to rule and supervise the
other classes.
is so special.12
special.

One questions, however, why the guardians' knowledge
It seems that all the knowledge in the city is

The primary difference between it and the others is that the

farmer's area of control is larger, and perhaps, more significant for

12
Francis MacDonald Cornford suggests that Plato's sole'pursuit
of wisdom, the enthronement of reason, as it were, cannot be the cureall for society's ills. He calls for some sort of compromise between
"existing conditions" and the enduring unquestionable principles without which any legitimate reform is jeopardized. See his The Republic
of Plato (New York: Oxford Press, 1965), pp. xxvii-xxviii, for
further elaboration.
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.the whale's well being.

But this fact is not shown yet.

One ques-

tions, too, why Plato attributes this ruling knowledge to just a few
citizens.

Nothing at this point would lead one to this conclusion,

excepting one precarious implication.

If the money-maker class (the

artisan) is the largest, the other classes (auxiliaries and guardians)
must be smaller in size.

And, since the money-makers' area of compe-

tence is particularized in the city, they, in a sense, preclude themselves from 'ruling and supervising' the whole.

But number or lack of

size should not be standard for determining the lack of virtue or existence of it.

In fact, after spotting wisdom, Plato admits of the pre-

cariousness of the argument when he states:

"So we've found wisdom •••

I don't know how ••• this one of the four ••• " (429a4-5).
Is their city courageous?
which defends the city.

Courage, to Plato, is that element

It is part of the city and has the power to

preserve opinion on what is terrible, what is the city's education, perseveres in spite of extreme pains, pleasures, fears and desires (429d).
It is like colorfast dye, impervious to lyes, sodas, and so forth.

In

the end, it is a kind of power that preserves what is right and lawful,
which requires education also.

Slaves or beasts are not courageous.

They lack education on what is right and lawful.
(430b7).

Theirs is not lawful

Lawful courage, on the other hand, can be either political

and/or general.

The former induces one to "die at the law's command"

(fn. 16, Book IV), and the latter is the willingness to question any
opinion.

In the end, likewise, all docilely agree that courage is a

part of their city.
The third virtue, moderation, is found and explained this way.
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It is not like wisdom or courage.
the city or in man.

Courage resides in the auxiliary, and wisdom re-

sides with the ruler.
soul of man.

Each resides in a particular part of

Moreover, both reside in a particular part of the

But to explain moderation, Plato takes a cue from the con-

ventional psychology.

The phrase, "stronger than himself," i.s connnon-

place, and it is applied to moderation in the following manner.

Plato

claims that "in the soul there is something better and something worse"
(43la4-5).

When one is considered "stronger than himself," one's better

self masters the weaker self, and one is praised for this behavior.
But, when one, by bad education or association, is weaker than oneself,
the worse larger part masters the smaller better part of the soul, and
one is blamed and considered licentious (43lb).

Given these psycho-

logical presuppositions, Plato's listeners agree, without debate or
discussion, that their newly founded city will be a moderate one
(43lb5).

Since many diverse bad pleasures and pains exist in the com-

mon many, they must be harmonized.

They must be controlled by the

better part of the city, that is, by permitting the simple desire and
prudence (wisdom) of the decent few to master them.
will be stronger than itself.
who shall rule.

Then, the city

All men will have the same opinion on

The "whole city from top to bottom will use the same

chart" (43ld).
To summarize, Plato seems to have made the following points about moderation.
and worse selves.

All men, including the budding guardian, have better
The primary difference between the ruling and the

money-making class is that the former is educated in the art of ruling,
and the latter is not.

The money-maker class contains more particular-
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art forms, while the art of ruling brings with it an unusual abil-

ity to master all unruly desires.

One becomes more simple and decent.

The guardians, in effect, are better than those multitudes who are unable to master their unruly desires.

One questions still the ability

of his guardians to master their selfish desires.

If each class has

its job, the money-makers must succumb to the ruler, since it is the
ruler alone who knows what is beneficial for the whole city.

They

must moderate their "love of money" to conform to the ruler's blueprint of what is advantageous for the city.

Again, how does the ruler

know what is advantageous for the city?
Finally, Plato discusses the "justice marble."

The notion comes

into view largely as a procedural affair.
That one practice one function naturally suited to oneself
(433a6-7) •••• One minds one's own business and does not meddle in
another's affairs, especially between the three classes (434c7-8) •
••• This the practice of minding one's own business ••• when it
comes into being in a certain way, is probably justice (433b3-4).
So, it seems justice provides the power by which moderation, courage and
wisdqm come to be accompanied with the power to preserve themselves.13
In effect, justice is a power derived from his own deliberations.

The

preceding discussion was the instrument by which "the virtues came to
be."

This notion is the result of his persuasion of the "others" to

believe that virtues exist the way they do.

He continues:

••• and, yet we were saying that justice is what is left over (a
residual) to preserve what was found (i.e., three virtues) (433c).

13

J. D. Mabbott somewhat reinforces this interpretation in his "Is
Plato's Republic Utilitarian?," 1"'.ind, 46, {1937), pp. 470-74. He maintains justice is a certain kind o{'.""Trconditional presence." It has the
power to render the soul harmonious. The hannony itself, though, is
justice. Harmony is not a consequence of justice •••• Just acts are.
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In addition to being a product of "debate," justice consists of something more than "what has come to be."

A cyclical effect appears.

It

acts, somewhat, like a catalyst for discussion as well as producing
things, i.e., the virtues •

...

He adds, however, virtues by themselves, cannot be ranked easily
with one another in terms of which can do the city.the most good.
Somewhat of a rivalry exists between justice especially and the others.
Each virtue is possessed by one of the classes.

Given that justice is

a power compelling one to practice one art, each class, in effect,
practices its own form of justice.

A money-maker's justice is to be

moderate, a guardian's is courage and a ruler's is wisdom.

The minding

of their particular businesses stems from the pervading power, justice
(433d5-7).

Rivalry diminishes and ranking becomes obvious, Plato im-

plies, when the ruler, in fact, exercises his justice.
has the skill or art to judge the merits of lawsuits.

The ruler alone
It is his duty

exclusively to decide what belongs or does not belong to another.

In

this sense, his justice, by his "special" knowledge, is the final
'say.'

The other two classes do not have such knowledge or power, al-

though each can do or have what is its own within each' s limits
(433c8-9).

But Plato still must show the peculiarity of the ruler's

competence to rule.
strated it.

Up to this point he has not convincingly demon-

Shall we take what he says on faith?

would be the first to answer in the negative.

It seems that he

CHAPTER IV
INTERNAL JUSTICE
The Divisions of a Single Man:

The Argument

We have seen Plato's treatment of justice viewed in the larger
sense, i.e., in the city.

But, for justice's forms (moderation, cou-

rage, wisdom) to be useful, they must apply to singie men (434e4).

A

city is just when the three classes mind their own business, i.e., each
practicing their peculiar virtues.

He contends that individuals, too,

are just if they possess these forms in similar ways.

It is apparently

self-evident to Plato and "the others" that if a city can have these
forms and dispositions, their possessing them must have been derived
from men.
(434e2-3).
man.

"Surely they didn't get ther.e from any other place"
So, it is a foregone conclusion that they exist in each

Men, Plato claims, have been influenced by three geographical

regions, namely, 1) the spirited disposition (courage) is from the upper
Thracian region, 2) the love of learning (wisdom) comes from the middle
Greek region and 3) the desire or love of money comes from the lower
Phoenician-Egyptian region.
support such influences.

Plato offers no evidence, however, to

They are accepted as being true (435el-7).

But, how are these parts of dispositions (forms) related to one
another in one's soul?
in some fashion?

Are they separate or are they linked together

Plato describes their relationships by using the

principle of contradiction.

One whole thing, at the same time, cannot

move and be at rest (436c4-5)..

A part of a whole, however, can either
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move or be at rest while another part does the opposite.
Plato's contemporaries (not his listeners) disagree.

Some of

They contend that

a spinning top, for example, as a whole moves and remains motionless
simultaneously, if its spike is fixed.
moving laterally.

It spins circularly, without

Plato sees the example differently.

He claims that

the surface of the top, i.e., a part of the whole, is moving in relation to the top's exact center, another part of the top.

A series of

centers forms an imaginary line called a straight or a vertical.
So, to Plato, the top consists of two parts, the circumference
and the vertical.

The circumference moves, while the vertical remains

straight and motionless.

It does not lean or turn.

whole top is not moving and moving simultaneously.
moves, while another part does not.

Consequently, the
A part of the top

Based upon this observation, he

concludes that parts of things can move while other parts remain at
rest.

No whole thing,

~

se, can do its opposite, simultaneously.

He

admits though that this sort of logic is somewhat frustrating, as he
remarks:
Let's answer this is so, go ahead, if it appears otherwise, all
our conclusions based upon it will be undone (437a5-6).
Plato's frustration is indeed shared also.
disheartened, at times, with his logic.

One becomes rather

To adequately understand the

principle of contradiction or of opposites, it seems crucial that one
knows what Plato means by "whole things."

He states that "whole things"

can not do its opposite (move and not move) simultaneously.

Using

Plato's examples of man, as a whole, and an arm, as a part of man, it is
implied that an arm (like, eyes, hair, etc.) is not a substantial part
of being a man.

If it were, Plato would be suspect of self-contradic-
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tion.

So, taking the arm as an unsubstantial part of man, Plato, at

least, should have explained the nature of the "whole man" or the "substantial man" to complete his argument.

As it is, he does not.

How

does one know, then, when a "whole anything" is not doing its opposite,
unless the "whole" is adequately defined?
Having set up a theory of opposites, he gets· further agreement
that human dispositions and actions can also be treated as opposites.
For example, to accept is opposite to refuse, to embrace is opposite to
thrust away, and so on.

Applying this activity to•a soul, a desiring

part of the soul longs for what it desires to be its own.

To the ex-

tent that pa.ct wills something, it says "yes" to itself, and then
reaches to it.

The opposite is also true.

what is not its own.

Another part will reject

The soul then has, at least, two distinct parts;

the desiring (the artisan in the city) and the forbidding (the ruler in
the city).
The difference between them, Plato suggests, is based upon what
each depends, i.e., on their objects (438d8-9).

The desiring part is

dependent on particular things primarily for its own benefit.

One

seeks spicy food, because it satisfies a particular desire; one wants
to learn a particular art, say, medicine, because one wants to make
money for oneself, and so on.

On the other hand, the forbidding part

is dependent on general objects supposedly aimed at benefiting the
whole thing.

It may forbid the u&e of spicy food, if it will injure

the whole body; it may forbid the practice of medicine, if the whole
body or even medical science, as a whole, is threatened,

Likewise, it

will forbid the desiring part of soul to act unruly, if the whole per-

....
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son's well-being is jeopardized.

The forbidding part has the ability

to calculate or to reason, and as such, its sole function is to master
the "bidding of the desiring part of the soul" (439c5-6) .14

Without

such an oversight function, Plato believes that the desiring part (the
artisan class) would expire from its own lust.
or reason that the soul opposes such vice.

It is by calculation

While Plato enlarged the

argument with the inclusion of the theory of contradiction, he essentially has not shown that the forbidding part (granting its existence)
possesses general oversight knowledge or that it too may not also be
self serving.
The last and third part of the triune soul, the spirited, is discussed.

It is as distinct as the others are or does it link with one

of them as an appendage?

By convention, he argues, that one is angered

(spirited) or makes war with one's desires when one succeeds in doing
what the calculating or forbidding part deplores, e.g., "looking at the
dead corpses" (440a4-5).

Plato implies that the soul treats the

spirited part as one thing.

It is considered the "anger" that the for-

bidding part manifests against the "desiring part."
when one goes against one's reason.

One blames oneself

For example, if one thinks oneself

unjust, a noble person is less prone to be angry at one's personal
suffering inflicted by one who seems just.

Or put another way, if one

14
William Chase Greene's "Paradoxes in the Republic," Harvard
Studies in Classical Philosophy, 63, (1958), pp. 210-11, believes it a
real psychological danger to say that one part of man is "better" than
another, meaning the other part is "worse." One can be torn with inner
• conflict. So, he suggests why term the natural desires "worse" and
reason, "better." Rather than setting up this sort of dichotomy,
Greene urges that Plato should have reckoned with the "whole man" and
begin to realize that pleasure has its proper place.
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is thought to be done an injustice, one's spirit allies with what seems
just, until it is soothed by one's calculating part (440e4).

As a re-

sult, Plato contends that the spirited part is considered as a third
part, but an auxilliary or appendage more or less of the calculating
part.
At this point in the discussion Plato feels that he has shown the
resemblance of the man to the city.

Despite the expressed disenchant-

ment with his argument, he is confident to conclude that a man can be
wise, courageous, moderate and just as the city can be.
justice is similar to a single man's justice.

The city's

If the ruler is wise and

rules the city, the calculating part is wise and rules the soul.

If

the auxilliary-guardian obeys and defends the opinion of the ruler, the
spirited allies with the calculating part.

Both must control the

largest part, the multitude in the city or the desiring part of the
soul.

Otherwise, enslavement or inappropriate classes will ruin the

city or man (442bl-2).

So, the entire city or whole is just, if

that which we are so of ten saying is operating and in the same way
(442d4) ••• Each part minds own business ••• so are you still looking
for justice to be different from this power which produces such
men and cities? ••• Answer, No, I'm not (443b3-4) ••• So, we probably
hit upon the c:>rigin and model for justice (443c).
Plato briefly compares, in summary fashion, justice to injustice.
Justice in the city is external justice.

It is a power that produces

wise, courageous and moderate men to take part of the public affairs of
the city.

Justice in men is internal justice.

It is a power that per-

mits each man set, as it were, his own house in order and be a friend
to oneself.

That is to say, each part has its duty, and each roust not
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meddle with another's.15

In this way, one will act rightly.

And, one

will act only when such actions will produce or preserve the condition
in which one finds oneself.

One shall be in the condition to be just,

according to Plato.
Injustice, on the other hand, is the opposite to justice.
parts of the soul or city are in rebellion with one another.
is rampant.

Meddling

The desiring part which ought to be a slave to the calcu-

lating part rules it.
tire.16

The

He characterizes this condition as vice en-

Vice in the soul or in regimes takes on at least four signi-

ficant forms, while virtue has only one, justice.
This one we've described, but it could be named in two ways. If
one exceptional man arose among the rulers, it would be called a
kingship, if more, an aristocracy (445d2-5).

15
In Rudolph H. Weingartner's "Vulgar Justice and Platonic Justice," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXV, (1964-65), pp.
250-·51, he states that psychologically all men have three parts (reason, spirit, appetitive) and, if each performs their own task, all men
will be internally just. Reason will rule, spirit will support reason., and the appetitive will acquiesce. The conflict arises, however,
he says,. when one's internal justice competes with the "ways" of the
city, external justice. So, it seems imperative to Weingartner that
Plato make it rather obvious how both kinds of justice can work in unison, instead of trying to show laboriously their existence.
16
R. W. Hall also takes notice of the relationship between internal and external justice. In "Justice and the Individual in the Republic," Phronesis, IV, (1959), pp. 155-56, he raises an interesting
dilemma, but unfortunately does not reach a satjsfactory conclusion.
He says that if most men are capable of internal (personal) justice,
they indeed could govern themselves by an intelligible drive within
themselves. Each man potentially has the "knowledge how" from this
educative precept. Subordination to the state is not that necessary.
But, he adds, a required degree of inter-dependence jg essential to
live peacefully. Each entity (state and individual) need each other,
is unclear on how this relationship will work.

CHAPTER V
POLITICAL POWER FROM THE GRAND LEAP TOWARD "KNOWLEDGE"
The Phi.losopher' s Edse Over the. Many
In the previous discussion, Plato has spoken of a pattern of justice.

He admits though that the pattern is

founding of a just city is like
ful human being.

~painter's

inhere~tly

precarious.

The

picture of the most beauti-

Each may resemble an ideal.

Speech is, as it were,

the tool that permits one to create the likeness of the ideal city.

It

is analogous to the painter's instruments with which one draws the ideal
man.

In the verbal sense, then, the just city is a possibility.

forewarns us, however, not to be too optimistic.

He

One cannot prove that

the founding of an actual city will be simila1· to the one created in
speech (472e2-3).

A natural paradox exists between what is said and

17
what actually can be done.

The nature of acting attains the less

truth than in speaking (473al-3).
Furthermore, things that come to be, by speech, are not the full
truth either.

Speech is, as it were, a giant step away from the ideal.

The likeness symbolized by speech and the ideal itself remain far

17
R. S. Bluck comments on Plato's ideal state. In his "Plato's
Ideal State, 11 Classical Quarterly, IX, (19 59), pp. 166-6 7, he maintains
that even Plato's rulers must restrain their appetites and redirect
their energies in one direction, otherwise their ruling ability is
weakened ----"a stream with many channels loses its force."
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apart from one another.18

Naturally men lack the precise language to

describe the ideal accurately.

One can only construct and describe

the conditions by which a city or a man can function in relative happiness.

The more the "conditions" are emulated, the happier man becomes

(472d).
To approximate the conditions (forms) of ju.stice, he strongly
advocates the blending of philosophy and political power in a man.
The existing ruler must learn to philosophize, or philosophers must
rule (473dl).
Plato defines for us what a philosopher is.
all kinds of learning.

General_ly, a philosopher is like other lovers,

e.g., sights, sounds, bodies.
thing loved ( 4 74c8-10).

A philosopher loves

Each lover desires all parts of the

Wine lovers make excuses to love all forms of

wine, although one kind is preferred over another.

The lover of houor

will even make excuses to love those honored men who ref use to reciprocate honors.
cant way.
like.

But, the philosopher is unlike the others in a signifi-

The "others" delight in fair sounds, fair bodies, and the

Their notion of "fairness" is applied to each sort of experi-

ence, and, as a result, it appears as many things.

Fairness is not

considered by them as one thing, i.e., the fair, itself.

.

The philo-

sopher, on the other hand, Plato asserts, can seize and delight in the
18
On the other hand, R. Demos argues that Plato's state as it is
written in words is not a factual one. In "Paradoxes ill Plato's Doctrines of the Ideal State," Classical Quarterly, VII, (1957), PP• 16567, he contends that Plato's state is purely an ideal one. "Th
. e ci. t Y
described can be found nowhere on Earth" (529a-b). Demos concluded
that Plato's state is indeed the City of Zeus. While a city may not
have been founded on Earth, it certainly does not follo"W that one better than an existing city could not be established.
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fair itself.

But, his assertion is a mere supposition.

The existence

of the fair and the other ideals come to be largely as a result of
Plato's cajoling Glaucon into granting their existence.

No evidence

was presented to substantiate their existentiality.
"It wouldn't be at all easy to tell someone else. But, you (Glaucon), I suppose, will grant me this. Since fa~r is opposite to
ugly, they are two. So, each is one. This same argument supplies
to justice, injustice, good and bad" (476al-6).
Besides receiving an outright major concession (free of debate)
from his brother Glaucon that ideals exist, Plato is next "burden" is to
explain how a few, rare men (philosophers) can perceive these ideals.
He does not explain "the how," but continues to dogmatize.

Philoso-

phers see "fairness" in things as a likeness or a reflection of the
fair, itself.

Those who "believe" the fair exists itself are awake.

Being awake is to know, and to know is to possess knowledge.19

On the

other side, most others cannot perceive the ideal, even if led to it.
They think

1

fairness 1 is an actual embodiment of the fair in a thing.

That is to say, the fair does not

exis~

in and of itself.

thing, inseparable from the visible world.

It is in a

So, these men dream.

"Doesn't dreaming, whether one is asleep or awake, consist in believing a likeness of something to be not a likeness, but rather
the thing itself to which it is like" (4 76c4-7)?
Plato's polemic begs two important questions, namely, 1) what is
19
In Steven Tigner's, "Plato's Philosophical Uses of the Dream
Metaphor," American Journal of Philo12.gy, XCI, (1970), pp. 208·-9, he
suggests that the Platonic 'dream' embodies some sort of intellectual
richness that is more overlooked than it should. The dreaming geometer of 533bc grasps the real, but does not account for his assumptions. They are i1narticulated. The acquisition, Tigner believes,
is on the way to episteme. Secondly, a dreamer to Tigner can be aware of dreaming, while moving to the real, which is richer than a
delusion where awareness is unplausible.
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the nature of the ideal, invisible world and 2) by what special knowledge do a few men perceive that world?

The mere statement alone that

a few men p()_ssess knowledge because they think thus and so, while
others do not think this way (they have opinion) .is certainly dogmatic.
The "special" insight of the philosopher borders on pure speculation at
this juncture.
A Short Epistemolo&ical Framework
Perhaps, in anticipation of such a reaction, Plato develops an
epistemology to clarify his ""'ppositions.

He divides "things" into

two extremes, i.e., things that totally are, and nothingness.
means one knows a thing entirely.

Knowing

One, then, possesses knowledge

which naturally depends on things that are, entirely.

So, knowledge

cannot exist in anyone, unless a thing is known completely.

Concerning

"nothingness," he states it is a complete absence of anything.
is the opposite of something entire.

It is an is not.

Nothing

Since it is an

opposite to something entire, nothing is entirely unknowable.

Anything

dependent on it is assigned ignorance.
But, full knowledge of anything is an impossibility for anyone,
even for the few, rare men.

The philosopher simply tends to find it

easier ci.nd more delightful to perceive more of the truth than other men
do.

They love all learning.

all things entirely.

The love to learn does not mean one knows

Consequently, if no one can be fully knowledgeable,

Plato must still explain the basic difference between the perceptions of
the few vis

.?..

vis the many.

By introducing what the notion of "opinion" means, Plato hopes to
give us a clue as to how and what the manY- perceive.

(The nature of the
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philosopher's perceptions will come later.)
answer, favorable, in part, to Plato:
(477e6-7).

Glaucon supplies a partial

" ••• one who can make errors"

If someone errs, .one lacks full knowledge of a thing.

mistake indicates one's view is an opinion.
is free of mistakes.

The

One possessing knowledge

On a theoretical level, Plato explains the dif-

ference between opinion and knowledge in the following way.
asserted that both are powers.
do what they can do.

It is

Powers are a class of beings capable to

Each power has a specific capability, and each

cannot be sensed.

Their difference lies upon what each depends and on

what they can do.

Knowledge depends on what IS alone, and it accom-

plishes faultlessness.

Opinion, on the other hand, cannot depend on

what IS and on what IS NOT.
ledge or ignorance.

Each entity is either the domain of know-

By the process of elimination, it seems, opinion

is relegated to another domain.
ledge and lighter than ignorance.
where in between them.

To Plato, it looks darker than knowAs a result, opinion must fit some-

Analogously, since opinion is neither light

(like knowledge) or dark (like ignorance), it is both of them, simultaneously.

It is dimly lit.

Ori&in and Content of the OEinion of the Many
Let us proceed to the original question.
sess, opinion or knowledge?
But, how will he show it?

What do most men pos-

For Plato, obviously, it will be opinion.
He is somewhat clever in the ways this con-

clusion is reached.
It is agreed that the best of "the many" see many fair things.
Playing upon a human foible, he asks whether there ever will be a time
when many fair things will look somewhat ugly too, and the just look
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somewhat unjust, etc.

Obviously, their answer was affirmative.

one, perhaps except Plato's chosen few, would say otherwise.

No

Man will

look at another man and say une is just, but at another time, will say
one is not so just, especially if the initial qualification is compared
to one more just.
tionships.

The same sort of argument holds for special rela-

A big thing may look small, if it is compared to a bigger

thing at another time.20
As a consequence of their admissions, Plato has accomplished what
he had set out to do.

His intention was to demonstrate that the many

fair things have something ugly too.
just things too, and so on.
or nothing.

Some just things have some un-

These things are neither fair themselves

They are something of both.

must fall between things and not being.
these extremes.

So, their appropriate place
They "roll around" between

Since these objects have come to light this way, they

must be opinionable.
both IS and IS N.OT.

Opinion is the power that is dependent upon things
.In .the final analysis, then, most men possess an

opinion of the many things.

The philosopher, however, is not so psycho-

20
On this point, R. E. Allen argues that Plato's "opposites" are
merely contraries. In "The Argument from Opposites V," Review of Meta.J?E.Y.sics, XV, (1961), pp. 326-29, Allen takes the position against the
Idealists who essentially maintain that what exists may appear self
contradictory. Self contradiction is the degree of reality in something, while things (substantive or evaluative) are not. They are
what they are which the mind beholds by degrees of understanding.
Allen, however, states that nothing can be incompatibly qualified.
Anything can be qualified by comparative or evaluative opposites.
That is, there is something taller or wiser than other things. So,
to Allen, Plato's theory of opposites remains unconvincing.
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logically disposed nor fooled.
Some philosopher-types generally considered useless and vieious men.

Plato admits the prevailing attitude is present, but it is

generally a false one.

He maintains that the most competent in any art

lack a good reputation by the "many."
denied the art of piloting a ship.

For example, a true pilot is

Most seamen who are a part of the

"many" believe the art of piloting is an unteachable one.

No one

really can know how to navigate a ship with the aid of stars.
conclude that any art attached to stargazing is useless.

So they

As a result,

the only way to be a pilot is to bribe, plot, kill, i.e. do evil deeds:
The same reasoning applies to the art of ruling.
is an unteachable art.
philosophers.

The "many" say that it

No one really learns anything from the true

They are queer, vicious men who also want to rule by doing

evil deeds.
Plato explains that this sort of obnoxious attitude is a result of
a badly educated philosophic nature.
ucation.

Each nature has its appropriate ed-

Since the philosophic is a vigorous one, it must be given a

vigorous education.

If it is deprived of its essential quality, the

nature becomes bad.

As a result of the deprivation, it will become

21
In a similar fashion, H. W. B. Joseph draws the same conclusion
that Allen draws. In Essa~On Ancient and Modern Phi~~...£.P.!:!y (Osford:
Clarendon Press~ 1935), p. 35, he suggests that Plato draws too rigid
a distinction between knowledge and opim.on. For Plato, only the "real"
is the object of knowledge, and the things between knowledge and ignorance are objects of opinion. Using Plato's own examples of double-half,
light-heavy, etc., Joseph contends that these illustrations are merely
relative terms, and, as such, still can resemble real things. "A" may be
greater than "B", but smaller than"C", but yet "A" still can be real. So,
it can partake in some sort of knowledge.
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worse than an ordinary or weak nature that is deprived of its appropriate education.

Greater injustices stem from exceptional natures

that are deprived.
convention, to

~'

This supposition rests purely on a psychological
"nothing good or bad can come from the weak or

ordinary" (49le3-5).
Plato believes that the typical sophist is an example of one
whose philosophic nature is corrupt.

The sophist teaches that the

angers, fears and pleasures of the "many" are embodiments of many fair,
just good things in the city, and they organize this teaching into an
art form.

Plato sees "the teaching" as a tool to appease the pleasures

of the "wild beast" (the many).

He sees himself, however, as a sort of

messiah, i.e., one who can save the philosophic from this sort of cor--...
ruptive influence.

He adds, though, in sort of desperation,

tha~

only

from necessity or divine intervention will a philosopher actually come
to rule a city.
Origin and Content of Philosophy
If the philosopher's likelihood of ruling becomes apparent,
Plato's messianic role of intermediary between gods, needs and the ruling art takes on special significance.
is meant by the Good.

The philosopher must know what

It is Plato's task then to explain it, as the

self-appointed sage of all that is right.
The Good is introduced as the greatest study, although Plato admits that it is difficult to understand.

However, to avail oneself of

it will permit the other virtues to become useful, beneficial, just
and~

in the end, make men happy (505al-3).

plistic pleasure that the "many" say it is.

But the Good is not a simThey speak of bad pleas-
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also,

Nor is it the simple prudence that the "refined" say it is

(505b4-5).

To Plato, the Good is a nebulous, somewhat mysterious con-

cept which every soul pursues, knowing it is something, and yet unable
to grasp it.

His philosopher alone can see a glimpse of it.

The Good in itself is like the other virtues are like in themselves.

The Good is like its own idea.

Recalling.his previous re-

marks, by speech, each thing is fair, is just, is, also, ugly and unjust.

The mixture of these qualities makes up the whole thing which

can be sensed.

r,

Moreover, each thing possesses the fiar itself, the

just itself, but these qualities cannot be sensed (507b3).

The fair

itself, for example, conveys an idea of itself which can o\y be
intellected.

It cannot be sensed. 22

Likewise, the Good itself con-

veys its own idea or likeness of itself (506e2-4).
To illustrate the likeness of the Good, Plato seeks to establish
a close comparison between the intellected likeness with the things
that are seen (or sensed).
visible world.

The intelligible world is related to the

Specifically, the Good is compared to the Sun.

The

Sun and the idea are the offsprings of the Good (508bll, 506e2-4 and
507b4-6, respectively).

His intention is to show that the nature and

operation of the Sun in the visible world will, help us understand the
22
Norman Gulley elaborates Plato's position on the role sensual
experiences have in achieving the Good. In "Plato's Theory of Recollection," Phronesis, XVI, (1956), pp. 207-8, Gulley suggests that Plato's
sensual images cannot be recognized as what they really are. A guardian's images may well have some sort of unity, but will still lack
true meaning (40lbc), since one's knowledge of their forms is wanting.
It is only when one is properly trained from "above" (40lde) that one
can begin to gain a knowledge of the Good. In effect, Gulley reinforces Plato's theory of Forms.
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character of the Good in the intelligible world.

23

He explains what happens in the visible world.
by sight.

Things are seen

Sight is a power that perceives things to be seen.

there are two distinct powers working with one another.

So,

The seeing

power (sight) is located in the eye, while the power to be seen (color,
shape) is in things.

Moreover, without light, a third power, neither

of the other two powers can be operational (507e3).
"yoked" by this most honorable power of light.

Both of them are

It seems questionable,

however, whether the power to see and the power to be seen are as distinct as Plato contends.

Certainly, three distinct objects exist, sun,

eye and object. But, to see seems to imply seeing something.
cannot see nothing.
B+ind men cannot see.

One

Nor can a thing be seen without the power to see.
Therefore, to see and to be seen seem to be one

in the same process, i.e. seeing.

In this sense, both powers are not

a distinct class of beings, but simply a coincidental process.
Plato further contends that the Sun, the source of all light, is
totally responsible for the three powers' operations.
Sun is the sole cause of the power to see (sight).

For example, the

As such, the Sun

23
A. S. Ferguson takes the position that the Sun and the Good
are both excellences, but remain in their own domains. In "Simile of
Light Again," Classical Quarterly, XXVIII, (19 34), pp. 132-4, Ferguson maintains that each entity does not overlap into the other's field.
He contends that Plato's intent is to show the nature of the Good by
describing, in an analogous way, what the Sun is and what it does. The
Sun causes good in the visible world. It is this world's chief benefacte¥", and it symbolizes 'seen things'. It is cause of light, though
it is not light itself, but something more. Likewise, the Good is the
cause of Truth, though not Truth or being itself, and it symbolizes
'unseen things'. Again, Ferguson's point is that a cosmological progression from the physical to the intelligible objects is not Plato's
forte.
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can be seen by sight itself.

In a sense, the creator (sun) of the

visi.ble world can be seen by its own creature (sight).
sight-depends on whether
it (508d).

t~e

The degree of

eye is turned toward the sun or away from

It is not difficult to understand why Plato asserts that

the power of sight is a separate class of beings.

It fits nicely with

his analogy concerning the intelligible world.
The nature of seeing (sight) in the eye is compared to the nature
of knowing in the soul.

To make the relationship vivid, the words

associated with seeing are placed in parenthesis alongside of his descriptions in the intelligible region.
When a soul (eye) fixes itself on fair things (shapes/colors),
illuminated by truth (light), it knows, intellects (sees) and it appears to possess knowledge (sight).
. sess an idea of the Good itself.
things that are both

1

possess only opinions.

The soul, then, is said to pos-

But, when it fixes itself on many

is 1 and 'is not,' it opines; and it is said to
He concludes that the Good does precisely what

the Sun does in the visible region.

It provides truth (light) to

things known (things seen) and the power to know (see) to the soul
(eye).

So, the Sun· occupies in the visible world a position analogous

to the idea of the Good in the intelligible world.

Moreover, as the

cause of truth and knowledge, the idea of goodness can be understood
to be things known themselves, similar to the way the sun is seen by
sight itself.
In effect, knowledge is a power distinct from a thing's power to
be known.

By separating the knower from the known, as though they are

two, he has been consistent with his theory of light.

But, why does
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Plato maintain the separation of powers theory?
teractions" simply a process of knowing?

Why not call the "in-

His entire theory of justice

rests on the notion that internal beings do exist.

They are the "re-

servoirs" from which powers emerge, an integral aspect of his view of
man's nature.
Educating in Philosophy by Similes and Allegory
Having come to the conclusion, though with diminished optimism,
that the philosopher-king could be realized, Plato embarks on the
training appropriate for such a ruler.

This point in the Republic

marks a transition from a discussion of the virtues, guardians and the
ideal state to a different level.

Previously, the guardians were told

to preserve the true belief about their duty to the state.
·belief is insufficient.

Now, true

At 497dl-2, there must be some knowledge that

the original lawmakers had.

The rulers must, in fact, be philosophers,

not simply men with true beliefs.

They must possess the endurance to

pursue the highest kind of knowledge.

But, he adds, this way is "the

longer and more difficult approach" than the dialectical journey in the
previous discussion..

Earlier the method in studying the virtues, for

example, was mainly psychological.

It was a moral psychology of ex-

plaining the virtues in terms of three aspects of the soul and the city
and the relations between each.
sophy.

At this point, Plato moves to philo-

If virtues are truly to be understood, a rigorous philosophical

tYaining must be undergone by future rulers.

Epistemological and meta-

physical considerations supercede psychological ones.
What is the highest kind of knowledge?
interconnected similes, namely, the

~un,

He explains it with three

divided Line and the Cave.

At
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505a3, the highest kind of knowledge is the fonn of the Good.
right acts and usefulness flow.

From it,

Although admitting the subject is a

disputed one, the philosopher, in any event, roust be able to grasp, at
least, a glimpse of it.
self.

He i.s unable, however, to discuss the Good it-

It is "not part of the thrust of this inquiry."

cides to talk on what the Good is like.

Instead, he de-

It is like its offspring.

Simile of the Sun
Let us discuss the similes briefly, and expalin their relationships in depth.

The traditional principle relationships between the

visible world and the intelligible world is:
VISIBLE
The Sun
Light
Objects
Sight

INTELLIGIBLE
------------·-----------------------·--·------------------------

Idea of the Good
The Truth
The Forms
Knowledge

Simile of the Divided Line
The Line simile is a diagrammatic one.

A Line is divided into

two unequal parts, the lower, smaller segment is the visible world ruled
by the Sun, and the upper larger portion is the intelligible world ruled
by the Good.

Each of these worlds are divided into two unequal parts.
FIGURE I

B

Intelligible
Region

E

c
D

Visible
Region
A
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The original Line AB is divided into AC and CB with AC divided
into AD and DC; likewise CB into CE and EB.
tain ratio exists between the Line segments:
and CE is to EB as AC is to CB.

So by construction a cerAC is to CB as AD to DC,

Therefore, a specific arithmetic ratio

is patented, namely, AD is to DC as CE is to EB.

It follows that DC

and CE are equal in length, i.e., the two middle p·ortions.

Also, Plato

states that each higher segment conveys more clarity and reality perceived.
How does Plato fill each segment?

AC is the visible world.

AD

represents images, shadows, reflections, while DC represents the originals of which the likenesses in AD are like.

The originals are living

things and artifacts, and their copies are the likenesses in PJJ.

In

addition, Plato asks us to agree that the visible world (AC) has been
divided in respect to degrees of reality and truth (aletheia) in such a
way that as the sphere of belief is to the sphere of knowledge (i.e.,
AC is to CB) so as the copy is the original (like AD is to DC).

In

this sense, the visible world is a copy of the intelligible world, the
original.

So, the visible world is represented as the world of belief

(to doxaston) (510a7-10).

This is an important passage for later con-

sideration.
Concerning the upper segment, the intelligible world, he takes a
somewhat different approach.

Instead of assigning different objects to

CE and EB, like he did for the segments below, he characterizes the
areas by different methods of inquiry.

In CE, the soul uses the ob-

jects of its immediate lower section, DC, as images.
the visible world are originals.

These objects in

In the uppermost segment, EB, the
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soul uses no images and inquiries simply by Forms.

In CE, the soul be-

gins from hypotheses or assumptions to conclusions, not to a first
principle, whereas in EB the soul goes to the first principle or the
beginning.

It seems clear that Plato is contrasting the method of

mathematics in CE with the philosophical method in EB.
four states of the soul to each segment of the Line.

He then assigns
Intelligence

(noesis) is put into EB, thinking (dianoia) with CE, belief or trust
(pistis) with DC and illusion (eikasia) into AD.
Allegory of the Cave
His last simile or allegory is the Cave illustration.
signed to express degrees of enlightenment.

It is de-

Dwelling in the lowest

part, a prisoner, figuratively, is chained to see shadows on a wall,
listen to "their" sounds and to assimilate "their" passions, desires,
loyes, and so on.
man.

Plato compares the cave prisoner to contemporary

"They are like us" (515a4).

of shadows.
wisdom.

So their reality and ours is a world

He continues by describing the release and the ascent to

One is freed, turns, sees the statues, and the fire itself.

This movement is painful and dazzling.

The prisoner still believes the

statues are less real than the shadows.

He, then, is dragged up to the

Cave's entrance to the sunlight.

This, again, is painful and dazzling.

He still prefers to look at the shadows.

Only until later, is he able

to look at the objects themselves, the stars, and eventually the Sun
itself (516b).
The rescued prisoner pities his former fellows and would be prepared to endure anything than return to his old beliefs and life.

If

forced to return, it would take time to accustom himself to the dark-
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The remaining prisoners, noting the freed man's dilemma, would think
the ascent had ruined his sight and would be ready also to kill any24
one who tried to be free.
Are Plato's Similes Used For 'Parallel' or 'Illustrative' Purposes?
Having looked at the three similes, let us piece them together.
The Line can symbolize four mental states of clarity associated to the
four classes of objects ascending the truth.

AD would represent the

lowest mental clarity and the lowest degree of reality.
the highest clarity and form of reality.

So, the Line could be the way

the mind would pass to reach the true reality.
apply the Line as a "parallelism."

EB would be

The Cave simile can

For purposes of illustration, let

us _place the lowest part of the Line at the Cave wall and run it
through and up the Cave to the Sun, itself.

One can assume, then, that

the journey through the Cave corresponds to the Lines' four stages of
.
11'igence. 25
inte
Another view is that the Line simile can be an extension of the
Sun simile, not a parallel condition.

At 509cl-2, Plato introduces the

Line "to complete the comparison with the Sun".

In the Sun simile, the

Sun gives light to the visible world, like the form of the Good gives

----------------24
N. R. Murphy elaborates this point in, "Back to the Cave,"
f!-23-:~-~cal

Quarterly, XXVIII, (1934). He suggests that "returning in
their turn" indicates to us that Plato is thinking of a cave as a permanent feature of his city. His city or regime is· not· the ideal that some
commentators say it is. Murphy interprets Plato as suggesting that
life itself is a continuous struggle to learn how to pursue the truth.
So, as discoveries are made, newer forms of the Good are also noticed.
25

See J. E. Raven's vivid account of "parallelism" in "Sun, Divided Line, and Cave," Classical QuaE_terly, III, (1935), pp. 23-28.
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truth to the intelligible world.

In the Line simile, Plato extends the

comparison with the Sun to illustrate how two methods of inquiry, with
the help of the symbols of the visible world, can lead to the knowledge
of the Good.

That is to say, the relationship between the Line's lower

segments is a clue to the relationships of the two upper segments.

For

example, AD represents shadows of originals, and DC represents originals.

This relationship of AD to DC is solely and simply the way CE

(math) and EB (philosophy) are compared.

Mathematics is a copy and

likeness of its original, the forms of philosophy.

Just as a tree is

clearer than its image in the visible world lit by the Sun, so can
philosophy be clearer than its image, mathematics, lit by the Good.

As

a result, the lower one-half of the Line is a pure illustration to the
26
top one-half. It is an analogous "illustration" relationship.
It seems doubtful that "illustration" was in Plato's mind when
constructing the Line simile.
parallel lines.

First, it is a continuous Line, not two

If he desired to illustrate a comparison of one region

to another, it would seem proper to draw two lines.

Further, at 510b,

510e and 5lla, Plato stresses that the mathematician uses images that
in the preceding sub-section served as originals.

The mathematics in

CE uses images of the originals in DC, which are reflections in AD.

26
J. L. Stocks endorses the illustrative interpretation. In
"The Divided Line of Plato's Republic VI," ~lassical Quarterly, XXII,
(1921), pp. 77-8, he maintains that the Line is not a progression or
a continuous' development, although he admits of degrees of clarity as
one moves up the Line. Stocks states that the lower Line stands for
a complete sensible reality and its upper part (DC) is a better representation of 'reality' than its lower part (AD). The same reasoning holds true for the upper Line. So, he concludes that an analogy
exists between the upper parts of both Lim: segments. A break separates them. Progression is not intended, then, in terms-Of objects.
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This suggests a certain degree of continuity between the four sections
each of which lying on a common scale of clarity.

If so, the purpose

of the lower Line cannot simply be confined solely to illustrate the
sections of the upper Line.
Moreover, at Slle, each of the four states of mind, assigned to
each Line segment, are to be arranged in proportioµ to the degree of
clearness their objects have of reality or truth.

The implication here

is that there seems to be a common scale of clearness applicable to the
four states of mind.

It would follow that a common scale of reality

applicable to their objects would also exist.
27
appropriate symbol for such an application.

A continuous Line is an

In addition, at 510a7-10, Plato refers to the whole lower Line as
a sphere of belief, e.g., "likeness stands to originals as belief is to
knowledge."

The world of belief would. comprise the world of particu-

lars, the world of the non-philosopher.

The word, belief, at 533d4 and

534a6 is used for the entire lower Line when he describes "thinking" as
a qual:i.ty of the mathematicians's state of mind.
between belief and intelligence.

"Thinking" is something

So it seems that the lower Line rep re-

sents the visible world of particulars and the non-philosopher's state
of mind, namely, belief or opinion.
For the following reasons, it is held that a "parallel" view of
Line and Cave fit more with Plato's intent in using the similes.

At

27
N. R. Murphy substantially agrees with this position. In "Simile
of Light in Plato's Republic," Classical Quarterly, XX.VI, (19 32), pp.
100-2, he states that the Line corresponds to one's mental state, and
the Cave is a pictorial representation of the mind's mental development
in each stage of the Line.
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517a-c, he instructs us on what we are to do with the allegory of the
Cave:
"This image as a whole must be connected with what was said before.
Liken the domain revealed through sight to the prison home, and the
light of the fire in it to the sun's power; and in applying the
going up and the seeing of what's above to the soul's journey up to
the intelligible place •••• "
It is crucial to understand what Plato means.by the word, "liken."

Does be mean to contrast the sunlit world with the firelit one in

the Cave?

"Liken" translated literally means to make like or compare,

not to contrast.

If this translation holds, Plato essentially is say-

ing that we must "compare" the region revealed by sight, symbolized by
the whole lower Line with the Cave.

So, it seems the lower Line is

parallel to the Cave.
Moreover, at the end of 533d-e, after explaining the role of
mathematical studies in rescuing the prisoners, Plato returns to the
Line, recalling the names he gave to the four states of mind represented by the four segments of the Line.

In making this comparison, he, in

effect, is implying that the lower Line also applies to the Cave.

Fi-

nally, in the Line, Plato makes extensive use of the shadow-original
relationships.

He, likewise, makes similar relationships in his de-

scription of the Cave.

In vi.ew of these remarks, it seems that he has

created a close correspondence, a parallel, as it were, between the two
similes.
Philosophical Significance of tbe Lower Line and the Cave
Let us discuss the lowest segment of the Line.
men are.

It is where most

So it would be important to discuss any philosophical signi-

ficance imagination (eikasia) may play concerning its objects, espe-
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cially in contemporary Athens.

In the lowest segment, is one's state

of mind, a "guess" on the shadows and their relations with one another
or is it a guess on the shadows as they are related to originals?

The

latter seems doubtful in view of Plato's restriction placed upon the
prisoner's head movement.
So, it seems then that

One cannot turn one's head in any direction.

t~ese

guesses are about

sha~ows

themselves.

One

does not guess about originals, though the shadows would also agree
with what was stated earlier concerning "parallelism."
By briefly sifting through the text, one also can establish a close
similarity between imagination and the shadows.

At 476c5-7, Plato

describes the non-philosopher as leading a dreaming life.
is "thinking" that the likeness is the original.

Dreaming

At 533c2, the math-

ematician, in his attitude to his hypotheses, is described as "dreaming about being."

If we use what was said on dreaming, in general, the

mathematician's state of mind will be one in which, in a sense, he
takes a likeness for the original, not realizing it is a likeness.
Finally, the mechanical:proportions of the Line itself indicates that
CE (math) is related to AD (shadows).

This suggests the mathematician

takes likeness for the original, as the man in the state of eikasia
28
does.
This may indicate that the state of mind is not one of guessing at originals through their likeness.

Rather, it is one in which

likeness is accepted as reality without realizing that the objects
28
This viewpoint is somewhat supported by D. W. Hamlyn's,
"Eikasia in Plato's Republic, 11 Philosophi.cal Quarterly, VIII, (1958),
pp. 20-1. He states that eikasia is not merely the taking of images
for originals, but the taking of what we call "images" as all that
ther~ is.
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29
seen are mere shadows.
If eikasia is understood this way, what would be the philosophical significance in contemporary Athens?

It was agreed earlier that

the lower Line represented the world of belief, besides being visible.
At 517d3-6, the plight of the philosopher is recognized who, when compelled to return to the Cave, must contend with the "shadows of justice, goodness, and the images."

It is suggested then that the shadows

of the lowest section symbolize, in part, the imitations of justice,
and so on, created by contemporary politicians, sophists, etc.

Corres-

pondingly, the state of mind that accepted these things as "real" would
be eikasia. In the second lower section where the released prisoner
looks at the originals he would be looking at first-hand facts and
reaching his own conclusions.

This exercise still would be opinion, al-

though somewhat more enlightened than the second-hand opinion below. One
is less likely to accept the arguments or semblances of the politician
who Plato regards as a substantial threat to the good life.

In view of

this danger, specifically, the imitations of the politicians of Athens,
Plato felt .it plausible to mark or separate them from the real things
of which they are images.

They are placed in the lowest section.

Similarly, he regarded a corresponding state of mind with the likeness
as philosophically significant for those heing deceived.
29
This point of view is elaborated upon in H. J. Paton's, "Plato's
Theory of Eikasia," Mind, VIII, (1963), pp. 82-3. I t is essentially
Hume's position on eik'aSia. Eikasia is the only way of knowing. "The
stream of impressions or ideas are the objects of the whole of reality."
The world of appe~rances is everything. Everything is what it seems
and seems what it is. "Everything is reality for me".
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Philosophical Treatment of the Upper Line and Cave
Let us turn now to the upper regions of the Line and Cave.
concern is on the relationship between:

Our

1) mathematical thinking (CE of

the Line) and the contemplation immediately after exiting from the
Cave and,

2) the philosophy or dialectic of the uppermost part of the

Line, EB, and the contemplation of the Sun,

itself~

First let us explain how Plato differentiates mathematics from
philosophy (dialectic).

The mathematician uses sensible objects and is
30
compelled to employ unproven assumptions.
The sensible objects are
diagrams or models, like a wooden triangle, square, etc. which are used

but are only images of originals in the section below, DC, which in
turn are copies in the lowest section, AD.

Although a mathematician

uses originals as aids, his thinking is not on them as such, but rather
on their image or copy, namely, the square, triangle or diagonal
(510d-e).

S, the content of DC serves as images for the mathematician,

and the content of CE are copies of the originals in DC.

Incidentally,

this continuing image-original relation may clarify what was stated a
mement ago concerning the suggestion that the two lower sections of the
Line are not solely "illustrative" of the two upper sections.
mary, then, the mathematician makes use of sensible models

In sum-

(wooden

30

A. E. Taylor maintains that the 'figures' relied upon by the
mathematician are unjustified tools. In "Note on Plato's Republic, VI,"
Mind 2 N. s., XLIII, (1934), pp. 82-3~ he argues that Plato uses the definite article before 'figure.' He explains that the geometer will discuss and try to construct all kinds of figures (unknown ones), knowing
that this exercise is a practical human impossibility. And, in as much
as this endeavor is impossible, the geometer's assumptions ultimately
rest on an unjustified assumption concerning what the genus, figure,
really is.

r
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triangles), but is concerned with the triangle itself.
From this brief introduction, let us discuss the specific objects
that concern the mathematician.

First the objects must be intelligible

ones, that is, not apprehended by the senses.
some other class of intelligibles.
intelligibles rather than Forms?
let us draw two triangles.

They could be Forms or

But, could they be another class of
To explain this possible distinction,

The actual drawn triangle, at the outset,

is particular, sensible and impermanent, whereas, a proposition about a
triangle would be general and permanent.

It seems, then, that Plato's

mathematician is not really concerned with drawings or models of a triangle, but rather with a proposition or the Form of a thing,
a thing is in and of itself.
unique.

~.e.,

what

On the other hand, however, each Form is

There is one form for a triangle, rectangle, and so on.

This

proposition implies that a class of geometrical objects exists above
sensible ones in an intelligible region.

They are like the sensibles

(e.g., the wooden triangle--the original) in that there are as many
kinds of Forms as there are many kinds of objects (although a Form is
a generalization of many particular objects of one kind).

But, they

are unlike sensible objects as they are unchanging and permanent.

So,

this is the way appropriate objects are provided for mathematical
thinking.

In addition to this persuasion, we could have argued by way

of Plato's definition of powers.
has its own object.

At 477c-e, he states that each power

So, if "thinking" is a distinct power or state of

mind, one would expect it to have its own object, namely, a mathematical Form.
But, what is the distinction between the Forms of the "thinking"
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mathematician and the "intelligent" philosopher?

"Thinking" and "In-

telligence" are different powers, so to preserve the principle, different powers, different objects, each person must have different Forms.
Plato is silent on the specific objects studied by the philosopher, but
he does contrast the mathematician's and philosopher's method of inquiry.

It seems that the Forms in the third section are separate, and

one's understanding of them is incomplete and fragmentary.

While, in

the fourth segment, they are seen connected to the Form of the Good,
and the philosopher's knowledge of them is complete.

So, the lower

Forms are independently and fragmentarily known, while in the uppermost
section, they are known as connected to one another and dependent on
the Form of the Good.
Differences Between Philosopher and Mathematician
'Mathematics seems to be a "bridge" to the study of philosophy or
dialectic.

The distinguishing mark between the mathematician and

philosopher is that the former depends on sensible objects and its

•

Forms, while the later never uses anything "sensible," but only Forms,
moving throughout them and ending with them.
cian is

half~free

cular objects.
ble.

For Plato, the mathemati-

from the changing, imperfect world of sensible parti-

He must use diagrams while thinking of the non-sensi-

It is for this reason Plato regards mathematics as the "bridge

builder" leading one from the sensible world to the intelligible and
why the various branches of mathematics can provide the initial training for the philosopher.

But, it is a preliminary sort of training,

since the philosopher put them aside and relies totally on the Forms
themselves.
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The question arises concerning how the philosopher makes this intellectual transformation.

He does not diagram the Form of justice like

the geometrician diagrams a triangle.

It is an obscure study.

It would

seem that if the philosopher were to compare justice to goodness, he
would consider how the words, just and good, are used in
cases.

But this is not Plato's style.

This

sor~

particula~

of comparison is un-

satisfactory to Plato's definition of the dialectical method.

The

trained philosopher will somehow apprehend the Forms in question independently of their sensible impression.

His world is the intelligible

one, a universal world, where there is no embodiment of universal Forms
in particular things.

Mapping out the Forms is entirely done in the

intelligible world.

One is inclined to say that this approach is a dif-

ficult undertaking.

Some actual cases, events, situations need study

before Forms can be clarified.

This clarification is bound up in the

world of action and sense, the visible one in which living takes place.
The second way the mathematician differs from the philosopher is
in the way each view hypotheses, i.e., assumptions.
Plato explains the difference.

At 510c-5lld,

The mathematician takes assumptions, as

known to be true, and uses them as first principles to derive certain
conclusions.

The philosopher, on the other hand, recognizes them as

hypotheses, simply unexamined assumptions, whose truth must be established.

He seeks, then, to identify the initial assumptions.

He moves

up, as it were, looking for more general assumptions until he comes to
something that is non-hypothetical, i.e., the first principle of everything (the Form of the Good).

He, then, reverses his steps, going

through each assumption and demonstrating how each is· derived from the
first principle.

To summarize, the mathematician does not establish
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the system nor his conclusions are shown to be true, in the strict
sense of "true."

Plato states, "How can something be knowledge, if its

beginning ••• end are unproved" (533c2)?

The philosopher, however, must

reach a genuine proved first principle.
Several comments seem to be in order here.
tios of the parts of the Line to one another.

Let us recall the ra-

CB ·is to AC as EB (in-

telligence) is to DC (belief), and also as CE (thinking) is to AD (illusion).

A parallelism exists between 'thinking' (mathematics) and il-

lusion (cavemen inside the Cave).

Thinking makes use of sensible dia-

grams and has a certain attitude toward assumptions.

But, which of the

two, diagram or assumption, does Plato want us to compare with illusion
(eikasia)?

It should be recalled that one in eikasia takes what is in

fact a copy for an original without reali:dng it as a copy.
of mind is simply unquestioning acceptance.

His slate

From this view, "thinking"

refers less to sensing diagrams than acceptance of hypotheses.
akin then to eikasia behavior.

It is

Illusions are accepted without ques-

tion, giving no account of underlying assumptions.
"The Deeper We Go, The Less We Know"
Let us investigate deeper into the mathematician's assumptions
and see how the philosopher treats them.

At 510c2-6, Plato gives math-

ematical examples of hypotheses, "odd-even numbers, ••• three sides of
angles. etc •••• "
time.

Presumably, these are the typical assumptions of the

At 533c, Plato further contrasts mathematics with philosopqy by

Eaying "the method of dialectic alone proceeds, destroying the hypothese~,

to the beginning itself to secure confirmation.''

It seems that

"destroying the hypotheses" means refuting their hypothetical nature.
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Dialectic seeks to derive hypotheses with which it begins from general
hypotheses to a non-hypothetical first principle.

As this method of

inquiry proceeds, assumptions lose their hypothetical character, i.e.,
they are destroyed as being hypotheses.

The mathematician assumes cer-

tain propositions and deduces from them, whereas, the philosopher i.s
not content with this logic.

His dialectical method attempts to esta-

blish the truth or falsity of the propositions assumed by the mathematician.
The philosopher follows a dialectical method of inquiry.

The in-

quiry goes from hypotheses to the first principle of everything, and,
then, proceeds down to specific conclusions.

Essentially this is all

Plato tells of a most important intellectual journey.
though on how a dialectician knows.

We can speculate

He may examine the consequences of

hypotheses or propositions to determine if any inconsistencies exist in
each of them or between them.

If inconsistencies appear, the hypo-

theses are abandoned or the inconsistent part, at least is discarded.
This process is continued until the first principle is reached.
attained, no hypotheses are necessary.
ledge, absolute certainty.

Once

The first principle is know-

It is the goal of the Republic, and accord-

ingJ.y, the philosopher with this knowledge is alone entitled to rule.
However, reaching the unchangeable hypothesis, the first principle, he
must somehow step out of the hypothetical meth_od.

Presumably, then,

it seems the hypothetical method is, somewhat, supplemented by intuition, a sort of an altruistic hunch.

That is to say, after the method

has reached its length, something "dawns" on the philosopher that this
is true.

This immediate awareness of the first principle is now the
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truth, it seems.

"Dawning" reminds one, however, of something Plato

stated earlier.

He asserts that "any method of study must be designed

to protect one's own interests" (530e5-7), and at 533a3-6, "we must insist that in the upper regions, Forms are seen by themselves.
are no images.

It is an end that ought to be."

There

It "dawns" on Plato

and the others that the entire discussion has been' designed to guard
what they believe as a right, namely, the laws which were established.
His philosophical study, then, becomes a circular argument and a somewhat devious way to protect law which, heretofore, presumably, rests on
philosophical wisdom.
biased,

One

So, "dawning" does not seem objective or un-

studies~

justify, "the design of the Republic."

One

does not study to verify the presuppositions upon which "the design"
rests.

In this sense, then, Plato's leap to the non-hypothetical be-

ginning lands on slippery, dubious ground.
So, to summarize the difference between the philosopher from the
mathematician, they are unlike in the use of sensible objects (diagrams) and in their attitude towards hypotheses.

Though there are

weaknesses in the mathematical method, it is essential to be trained in
mathematics, initially, to become a philosopher.
lines a mathematical model.

Plato briefly out-

Studies that draw the soul from the world

of change to reality is the central recommendation Plato makes.
the acid test, as it were, for higher education.

It is

It is a power that

can lead a soul from the changing world of sense experience to the
changeless objects grasped by intelligence.

He lists several, but two

of which may shed light on the philosophic method.

The study of astro-

nomy should not be done to simply exa.11ine the "embroidery in the heavens" or the movements of the stars.

One must try to determine the
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ultimate cause of the heavens.
concern.

Natural phenomena is not Plato's real

This is where calculation and number come to play a part.

By

calculation, one may collect and name objects one thing and another
thing.

It is more important to recognize differences between things

than to simply count or accumulate things.

To note differences implies

that there are, at least, two things present.

Each is one.

In the fi-

nal analysis, Plato's mathematician becomes a philosopher, if he is
able to take a comprehensive view of the mutual relations and affinities which bind all things together as one, and finally, to see how
everything stems eventually from the first principle, the Form of the
Good.
So far justice has not appeared in the discussion, and one wonders how Plato hopes to show by it that the just man has a happier
life.

At 586d-e, he mentions that a man pursuing the love of money,

for example, and following the guidance of the prudential part of the
soul (calculating part) will achieve _!:he
capable.

~st

real love of which he is

In effect, the whole soul must obey the love of the calculat-

ing part which is wisdom.
than the love of money.

The love of wisdom then is a higher desire
This is a simplified recall of his description

of "inner justice" alluded to much earlier.

In any event, it is not

clear here in his summation at 586d-e how the hierarchy of desires is
established.

For example, how will the love of money or for that

matter the desire for anything, controlled by the reason (calculating
part) make the desired pleasure any less real, if the calculating part
did not rule?

CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY CONCLUSION
Has Plato succeeded?

Has he adequately shown that justice itself

can make men happy in a city?

In broad terms, Plato believes that jus-

tice will emerge in a city only when all political change is arrested.
The city must be rigidly stable operating with clock-like efficiency.
Each individual must do his own job and remain in his own class.

No

deviations from this norm are acceptable and, indeed, are deemed criminal.

Everyone works for the welfare of the whole city regardless of

i.ndividual interests.

The city's interests in most, if not all ways,

surpasses the individual's.

Essentially, then, Plato's justice will

produce an authoritarian political system.
An authoritarian regime can be characterized as being composed of
most of the following elements.

There is virtually no division of

political power among a society's social groupings.

Political competi-

tion is suppressed, concentration of political power essentially rests
in the hands of a few, an elite group which tends to manipulate the
majority of men by devious means to monopolize such power.
sizes a citizen's obligation to compulsory labor.

It empha-

It consists of a

frivilous and coercive domestic and foreign policy, inspired, perhaps,
by some form of ideological Messianism geared to discipline its own
society and to conquer others.
Let us review Plato's political thought in light of this criteria
and determine whether his form of justice will make men happy.
80
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Plato's justice imposes some rather rigid political prohibitions
on the artisan's class's ability for self defense.

They cannot defend

their individual or class interests while the guardian class can.
Class differences rest on a rather vague principle of naturalism underpined by Plato's theory of education. (cf. pp. 3-5)

Each man is dispos-

ed to perform one art suitable to his nature. (cf. pp. 27-8)

Men are

then divided into three classes in which all are to mind their own business within their respective groups.

While denying the guardians the

right to private property on a puzzling argument that it is selfish
and destructive to the city (cf. pp. 35-6), Plato, however, does grant
them the exclusive right to bear arms to defend themselves and the city.
It seems rather superficial though for Plato to deny material things,
i.e. property, to the guardians, while at the same time granting them the
exclusive right to control "those things" unilaterally with the force of
arms if the occasion arises.

Any potential adversary undoubtedly is the

other class, the artisans. (cf. pp. 16-19).
Plato argues though that the right to bear arms is based upon the
guardian's sole knowledge of what the true opinion of the ruler is, whereas·
the artisans lack such insight. (cf. pp. 24-6)
posedly rest on their natural superiority.

This special insight sup-

They are the few men who can

rule rightly and defend the ruler's opinion. (cf. pp. 42-4)
consists in a philosophical, spirited and gentle disposition.

Superiority
But, how

valid is Plato's natural superiority doctrine in terms of extending such a
grave, solemn right to a select handful of men?

Presumably, they must

possess the most unimpeachable credentials and character traits.

A sub-

stantial lack of these personal attributes would indicate that Plato's
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chosen few could conceivably usurp or snatch away considerable portions
of political rights, e.g. dialectics (free speech), property, self defense,
from the artisans.

Moreover, to claim an elite ruling competence without

adequately justifying it or, in fact, disguising it, as he does, by devious
logic surely is a blatant disregard to the remainder of society's interests,
including other guardians.

The real question then hinges on whether Plato's

chosen few do, indeed, fit into his paradigm of ruling competence.
rulers do, no quarrel is justifiable.

If the

If not, Plato's rulers certainly lack

credibility.
Plato states that guardians alone have the good disposition to
rule competently.

Let us see if they do.

From the text Plato had argued

that if the noble dog can be gentle, savage, and philosophic, so could
man.

These three qualities can reside in one thing, man or beast.

This

sort of disposition, he states, is primarily a product of one's own nature
emerging in one's "tender years" before the age of nine.

One begins to

know a good or a bad thing (friend or enemy) by some sort of natural intuitive knowledge. (cf. pp. 16-19)

Outside enviornmental experiences in

these early years, for the most part, are literally dismissed as inconsequential factors for developing character.

Given this dismissal of envior-

nment over character as Plato has virtually done, a charge of logical inconsistency can be leveled against him. (cf. pp. 17-19)
that true learning is the philosopher's first love.
Plato's also.

Plato tells us

Certainly it is

However, it falls upon his shoulders, at least, to explain

in some cogent fashion why he minimizes the importance of enviormnent
and telling us little about the nature of intuition.

Simply declaring that
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th dog or man will "mirror its own good disposition" muddles the
real question. (cf. pp. 18-19)

The so called, "good disposition" con-

ceivably could be a product of a subtle conditioning process by master,
teacher or others before the age of nine.

If so, a well disposed child-

guardian may not be chosen for some special innate attribute, but rather
for his docile willingness to believe (faith) via the conditioning process
the teachings of Plato on the just regime.

Surely it is Plato's burden

to have shown why this analysis is not very likely to occur.

In this

sense then the "good disposition" theory rests on rather vague slippery
reasonable grounds.

In this regard, precluding artisans from bearing

arms on the basis of the theory essentially amounts to an elaborate subterfuge to deny them any individual political rights or class interests.
This denial certainly fits neatly into an authoritarian paradigm.

Will

the artisan, for example, be content or happy with this kind of political
deficiency?

We think not.

Given this rather obvious tenuous theory, Plato is, more or less,
personally self-induced to find a way to reinforce the "good disposition"
of the guardian as well as foster his basic trust or faith in the teaching.
So, he adopts a rather harsh censorship policy.

Being acutely aware of

the fragility of human nature (rulers and guardians included), he advocates a conscious sheltering of the young in their tender years from being
intellectually exposed to the many prevailing views on justice. (cf. pp.
20-22)

But, is not this a form of Platonic conditioning?

Moreover, by

legal compulsion the young are forbidden to hear any tales that would disunite the regime.

Included in the list are stories on warring gods, all
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the pernicious lies by Homer and Hesiod on the most "sovereign things,"
the listening even to "complex narratives" from stage performances.
(cf. pp. 20-28)

In addition to this sort of "educational" policy, he

promises the guardian a reward in "after-life" presumably in return for
his act of faith and a courageous defense of the teaching.

(cf. pp. 24-26)

In the end, then, Plato has built a monolith of propaganda for the development of his program, but neglecting to give us any reasonable evidence
which clearly explains the wisdom of the teaching or the special insight
the ruler/guardians have over the artisans.
The question of lying also raises an interesting dilemma in the
Republic.

Plato's philosopher, as we indicated above, is supposedly a

lover of truth.

But, the philosopher, himself, is not quite truthful.

He is permitted to deceive the artisans when he alone thinks such decep·tions can benefit the city.

No one else can lie and, if one is caught

lying,· harsh penalties are administered. (cf. pp. 23-25)

But the is-

suing of such penalties as death or exile on the pretext of knowing
what is good for the city, while, at the same time, admitting a ruler's
fallibility, surely, seems consistent with an authoritarian regime.

It

is the clock-like efficiency with which Plato is primarily concerned to
preserve all political stability.

So, it is politically expedient for

the ruler alone to use the priviledge of lying.
be happy with this sort of political system?

Again, will the artisan

It seems rather dubious.

But, of course, much of anyone's happiness ultimately rests on whether
the ruler

k~

what is good for the city.

But, if his knowledge is

that special, any political dissatisfactions become mere peripheral
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private probelms to be worked out later.

Surely, no one would quarrel

with this formulation.
Another example of Plato's political utilitarianism is seen in his
comparison of the ruling art and the medical art.
Aesculapius, is like the wise ruler.

The wise doctor,

The medical art's primary aim is

not to prolong life, but rather it is geared to serve the interests of
the city, not those of individual men or the artisan class.
time to spend life ailing or, indeed, getting cured,

No one has

(cf. pp. 19, 30-33)

Besides, the infirms' offspring are considered,burdensome to the city's
clock-like efficiency.

This sort of strong medicine is aki.n to admin-

istering "political lies."

The philosopher-ruler must be able to order a

great many lies to maintain this efficiency.
virtually exterminated.

Sick drones, as it were, are

Being truthful, then, is not one of Plato's

avowed political policies.
His regime condones the kinds of falsifications that are primarily
designed to control the great mass of its population, i.e. the artisans.
Free speech (dialectics) on the most sovereign things is prohibited especially in large assemblies.

Men there tend to act like "wild beasts"

agreeing or disagreeing on the basis of the persuasive abilities of the
speakers,

The myth of the metals should be believed as a "truth."

places the regime's population in appropriate classes.

It

Over time the myth

will be generally accepted as traditional by future generations who will
view it as reli.able.

But, it too, as we had pointed out in the text, is

merely a faith doctrine without credibility. (cf. pp. 30-34)

The common

ownership of property is another essential device to control the masses,
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although it too fails to answer our exceptions. (cf. pp. 35-36)

The

merits of the broad economic class supposedly stabilizing the material
needs of the regime ultimately seems prone to cause the regime to endorse
a fierce foreign and domestic policy.

Ostracism or death for deviant be-

havior are likely punishments. (cf, pp. 37-40)

In the absence of adher-

ing to these forms of doctrinaire falsifications, Plato must have known
that the tripartite class system would quickly disappear.

He even seeks

to exclude the young, potential guardian from knowing or demanding to know
the truth •

Truth seems to be lost in the regime's history.

In the end,

this sort of city planning by a devious system of deception is merely
geared to strengthen the regime '.s political stability and led by the untenable attributes of the "chosen few."
On the matter of discovering justice, Plato essentially pretends
to argue to it,

Indeed, it seems that he cleaverly soothes his listeners'

critical abilities.

"Having seen Wisdom and Courage emerge, whose resur-

rection Plato even admits is a precarious one, two remain, Moderation and
Justice."

Moderation is simply a satisfaction with one's place in life.

Justice appears after the other three begin to operate efficiently.
is essentially a procedural result, a residue,

Justice

It is the last piece of the

city's puzzle called, it seems, "togetherness."
It is just to remain in one's class while practicing what is one's
own.

But, one's own seems to be applied to a class as an inalienable pos-

session of the class rather than as a personal one.

One's own really turns

out to be not one's own individually, but "our own" separate classes within
which all men are judged similarly.

By serving the class, one serves the
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whole.
ish.

Class egoism is unselfish, while individual interests are selfBy proposing this polemic, Plato adroitly appeals to one's sense

of humanism and unselfishness, while implying that others who cherish
private gain are selfish. (cf. pp. 35-37)

Although Plato attempted to

diminish private gain, its effects struck at the heart of one's political
rights.

Men, especially the artisan, could not go their own way.

They

are locked into a class system where any mobility was shunted in a downward direction to more menial tasks within the class.
be a guardian.

No artisan could

Plato's artisan then is compelled to turn from a "love

your fellow man" ethic to the political demand of "love your city first"
kind of morality.

The public

or class interests.

inte~est

extremely outweighs any individual

In this regard, the justice fostering a class egoism

is much more politically expedient than one geared to serve, say, several
million separate individual citizens.

Besides, due to his awareness of

the fallible ruler, Plato found it more politically expedient that the
ruler's chances of maintaining a wise and courageous profile is greatly
enhanced when dealing with two distinct classes than with millions of
separate individual interests. (cf. pp. 51-52, 57-59)
Admittedly, Plato states ruling will be bad (incompetent).

He

is not optimistic for true justice to emerge, but claims a special hope
for the regime.
of justice.

A regime can improve if it emulates or copies the idea

Given this inherent weakness in rulership, he attempts to

alleviate the problem by adopting an organizational solution.

How can

proper governmental arrangements be devised to diminish incompetent ruling?
We have seen his answer.

It is in the selection and training of "natural"
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leaders by an educational system of indoctrination, censorship and
deception.

Their minds are shaped to the extent of becoming virtually

incapable of doing anything independently.

Further, only those guard-

ians beyond the prime of life would be admitted to the ruler's higher
education, i.e. dialectical training. (cf. pp. 39-41)
delay, since it manifests Plato's fears of the
itical thoughts.

young~s

It is a devious
searching pol-

Their natural curious insight tends to bring with it

a tendency for more political unrest than Plato would like.

As a

consequence, it is only after they "prove up" through the molding effect,
alluded to earlier, courage in military campaigns and so on, would they
be then placed into leadership positions to carry-out the regime's
policies.
From these rather negative considerations, one learns that the philosopher is not one who actively and truly seeks the truth, although Plato
portrays him as one who does.

Supposedly, the philosopher 1) has great

insight into the truth, 2) is a learned man, 3) can recognize the ideal
world's existence, 4) is proficient in dialectical power and 5) can pattern
the city after the heavenly ideal model.
In addition to these distorted claims of Plato, his descriptions
of the idea of the Good in the similes do not fully explain what specific
deeds are good in themselves and which ones can produce good results.
The descriptions are not associated directly to the idea of the Good.
(cf. pp. 58-62)

Good, to Plato, is simply that which preserves the things

he wants to preserve, and evils are the things that do not arrest political
change.

Admitting his inability to explain the Good, one surmises that the

good regime is simply permanently stable virtually lacking the clear evidence
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to justify this sort of stability.
One question comes to mind concerning why the philosopher shall be
the permanent ruler in view of the prohibition that subsequent rulers
or anyone for that matter cannot introduce any substantial political innovations.

Once the "educational" system is firmly established, why not

have the guardian class rule the regime?

Certainly, the need for a phil-

osopher is not simply for administrative purposes.
be

virt~ally

Administration will

useless, since the educational institution can effectively

maintain the proper philosophical standards without the philosopher,

~

se. The philosopher is seen °largely as an "extra piece of baggage" after
the institutions are operating.
Consequently, what theory underpins Plato's reliance on the philosopher-ruler, if it simply is not an educational motivation?

It seems that

his philosopher functions like a theocratic ruler. (cf. pp. 49-52) Plato
drew a definite line between ruler and ruled.

The philosopher alone is

able to recognize the forms of the invisible world, an area where no other
class, i.e. the artisan, could trespass.

In addition, the permanency of

the philosopher is desired to improve the natural excellences of the citi·zens.

That is to say, as dogs are bred into "better stocks" so can men

be bred to produce better offsprings, better dispositions which, in turn,
will produce better educational systems. (cf. pp. 35-7)

Presumbably, the

philosopher alone can see the real image of man in the invisible world.
He alone has the desire, endurance, and ability to copy the heavenly original.

In the end, then, the theocrat-ruler using this special, private,

somewhat secret knowledge must continue to deceive the artisans, even to
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the extent of quietly selecting their mating partners.

It is clearly

obvious the ruler fears offending the artisan class's marital relations,
tantamount to inciting a real disruption in the regime's stability.
Finally, everything previously discussed and analyzen must now
focus on how the philosopher-ruler possesses this special insight.

Why

is the art of ruling more significant in the city than, say, the art of
repairing shoes?

What special knowledge does the philosopher have that

the shoemaker, for example, does not have?

Plato's discussion on the

existence of the ideal world is somewhat plausible, although it contains
several basic presuppositions that lend itself to legitimate skepticism.
On the question of ideals existing separately, one learns that their
existence was granted largely by Plato's ability to cajole his listeners.
(cf. pp. 52-54)

As a result, each "i_deal" may not be catagorical oppos-

ites or as exclusively independent as Plato suspects.

The suggestion is

that they are relative predicates.
Concerning the question of whether justice is intellected and
the object of knowledge, the following points were made.

Although his

epistemology is consistent with theories of light, seeing, and being
seen, it is maintained that separating the power of knowing from the power
of being known and thereby claiming two separate operations, having their
own classes (powers) of existence are highly problematic inferences.

It

is suggested that "knowing", likewise, "seeing" are coincidental functions
with being known and being seen. (cf. pp. 60-63)
In his use of similes, Plato attempted to show the reflection
process and use it in terms of how "copies" of the visible world are
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related to "originals" in the intelligible world.

To explain the

relationship Plato used the Line and Cave similes, and it was suggested
that both similes are "parallel" in their character.

That is to say,

a shadow of man in AD is a copy of the original man in DC.

The wooden

triangle in DC is a copy of the original form , i.e. the genus, triangle,
in CE.

Being aware of these relationships, say, the·Form in CE

vis~

vis its counterpart in DC, one supposedly should explain how the entire
lower segment of the visible world, AC, can pattern the entire invisible
world in the upper segment, CB. (cf. pp. 65-69)

But in an apparent act

of desparation, Plato simply asserts that the pattern of the just city
described in the visible region, (AC), ought to be and is the correct
resemblence of the ideal invisible Form, Justice.
Plato's picture of the ideal world presents a puzzling set of
conditions.

The just pattern in the city despite its many psychologic-

al presuppositions, propaganda and deceptions could even be condoned, if
the above descriptions were fully clarified.

Namely, does the philos-

opher-ruler indeed tend to possess more of the knowledge of the ideal,
Justice, than the other classes or other individuals?

There is no doubt

that Plato possesses an ingenious argumentative style, but even so one
learns that the "final act" in the drama, the climax, is quietly discarded or covered-up.

(cf. pp. 76-78)

Instead of succinctly explaining

how possession tends to occur, he instructs us, in the final analysis,
to accept the existence of the possession presumably on the discussion's
dialectical merits.

This sort of argumentation, however, lends itself

to circular logic.

His leap to justice is essentially then an elaborate
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process of intuiting the nature of the possession.

The "pattern of

justice" in the city does not essentially depend on the "knower" any
longer, but on the "supposer."

The "supposer" believes that his

awareness of the pattern is the correct one.

Although admitting man's

fallibility in trying to symbolize the ideal in words, everything presented to us along Plato's dialectical journey supposedly rested on
knowledge. (cf. pp. 78-79)

It is learned however that Plato's teach-

ing simply rests on supposition, although prodigiously arranged and
argued.

The gnawing question still remains.

Can a hunch, as it were,

on the art of ruling be the crucial factor in making the city just and
men happy?

Given the authoritarian character of the discussion, it

seems certainly to frustrate happiness and too awesome a political
power to hand-out to a few men who happen to have a "hunch" on the correct
ruling pattern.

In this regard, it is concluded that Plato's notion cf

justice is convincingly authoritarian tending to make life somewhat sad
for the rest of society.

In the final analysis, a good shoemaker tnay

well practice his art as well as or perhaps better than a ruler who may
guess much of the time.
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